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ABSTRACT
This article explores the ethical and legal implications of enrolling
individuals with disorders of consciousness (DOC) in
neuroimaging research studies. Many scientists have strongly
emphasized the need for additional neuroimaging research into
DOC, characterizing the conduct of such studies as morally
imperative. On the other hand, institutional review boards charged
with approving research protocols, scientific journals deciding
whether to publish study results, and federal agencies that disburse
grant money have limited the conduct, publication, and funding of
consciousness investigations based on ethical and legal concerns.
Following a detailed examination of the risks and benefits of
neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC, the author
urges IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies to no longer
stall the conduct, publication, and funding of neuroimaging
research into DOC if certain criteria designed to protect the health
and safety of individuals with DOC are satisfied.
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I.
¶1

INTRODUCTION

For centuries, disorders of consciousness1 have captured the attention of

1

The nature of consciousness is widely debated and difficult to define. See, e.g., TORIN ALTER & SVEN
WALTER, PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS AND PHENOMENAL KNOWLEDGE: NEW ESSAYS ON CONSCIOUSNESS AND
PHYSICALISM (2006) (examining the nature of consciousness); Michel Jouvet, Coma and Other Disorders
of Consciousness, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 116 (P. J. Vinken & G. W. Bruyn eds., 1969)
(“[C]onsciousness is very difficult to define.”). In this article, I adopt a clinical neuroscience approach and
use the word “consciousness” to refer to two elements: an individual’s wakefulness and her awareness of
self and environment. See, e.g., Steven Laureys et al., Self-Consciousness in Non-Communicative Patients,
16 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION (forthcoming) (“For the purposes of clinical neurosciences,
consciousness consists of two basis elements: arousal (i.e., wakefulness, vigilance or level of
consciousness) and awareness of environment and of self (i.e., content of consciousness).”); Steven
Laureys, The Neural Correlate of (Un)awareness: Lessons from the Vegetative State, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE
SCIENCES 556, 556 (2005) (“Consciousness has two main components: wakefulness and awareness.”). I
use the phrase “disorders of consciousness” to refer to coma, the vegetative state, and the minimally
conscious state. THE MOHONK REPORT, A REPORT TO CONGRESS: DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS:
ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND RESEARCH NEEDS 6, available at
http://www.nbirtt.org/resources/Mohonk_Report_Press_V2.pdf (last visited July 19, 2007) [hereinafter,
MOHONK REPORT] (defining disorders of consciousness, including coma, vegetative state, and minimally
conscious state). See infra Part I(A) for relevant definitions and diagnostic criteria.
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physicians, scientists, philosophers, lawyers, and families.2 When an individual partially
or completely loses consciousness, the answers to questions such as “Can she hear me?”
“Does he understand me?” “Is she suffering?” and “Will he get better?” can have
profound clinical, ethical, legal, and social consequences.3 In this article, I explore the
ethical and legal implications of enrolling individuals with disorders of consciousness in
neuroimaging research studies.
¶2
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, physicians have used the traditional
neurological examination to diagnose disorders that we now classify as coma, vegetative
state, and minimally conscious state.4 Although coma can be diagnosed with relative
ease, the differential diagnosis of the vegetative and minimally conscious states can be
challenging.5 In addition, clinicians presently know of no medications or surgical
interventions that will definitively reduce the length of an individual’s impaired
consciousness.6
¶3
Over the past decade, however, scientists have used various functional
neuroimaging technologies to better understand disorders of consciousness, improve
differential diagnoses, predict short-term improvement, and lay the foundation for future
studies that may, someday, identify methods of communicating and treating individuals
with disorders of consciousness.7 During the past four years, scientists have made a
2

See GERMAN E. BERRIOS, THE HISTORY OF MENTAL SYMPTOMS: DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY SINCE
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1996) (surveying the history of mental disorders, including disorders of
consciousness, from the nineteenth century to the present).
3
See Laureys, Neural Correlate, supra note 1, at 557 (asking, “Do patients in a vegetative state feel or hear
anything?”); Joy Hirsch et al., fMRI Reveals Intact Cognitive Systems in Two Minimally Conscious
Patients, SOC’Y FOR NEUROSCIENCE (2001), available at http://fmri.org/pdfs/NS2001.pdf (last visited July
9, 2007) (asking these questions); Joseph J. Fins, Rethinking Disorders of Consciousness, HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT, May 31, 2005, at 22-24 (examining how functional neuroimaging study results are used
to cast doubt on the ethical propriety of withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment); MOHONK
REPORT, supra note 1, at 17 (“Disorders of consciousness have profound social, ethical, and economic
consequences.”).
4
Very generally, a neurological examination is the clinical assessment of a patient by a physician to
determine, among other things, the patient’s responsiveness to external stimuli. See, e.g., Roger A. Barker,
The Neurological Assessment of Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, 15
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL REHABILITATION 214, 214 (2005) (describing the neurological assessment of
patients in the vegetative and minimally conscious states). The modern neurological examination evolved
between 1850 and 1914. B.M. Patten, The History of the Neurological Examination, 1 J. HIST.
NEUROSCIENCE 3, 3 (1992).
5
Lawrence R. Huntoon, The Perilous Vegetative State, 10(2) J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 35, 35
(2005) (recognizing the difficulty of differentially diagnosing the vegetative and minimally conscious
states); Roxanne Pickett Hauber, Better Care for Low-Level Brain-Injured Patients and Their Families, J.
NEUROSCIENCE NURSING, Feb. 1, 2002, (“While the state of coma is relatively easy to diagnose, differential
diagnosis of other states of reduced consciousness, such as the vegetative and minimally conscious states,
have proven to be much more difficult.”).
6
See, e.g., Steven Laureys et al., How Should Functional Imaging of Patients with Disorders of
Consciousness Contribute to Their Clinical Rehabilitation Needs?,19 CURRENT OPINION NEUROLOGY 520,
520 (2006) (“No treatment has been proven to alter the course of recovery from [vegetative state] or
[minimally conscious state].”).
7
See, e.g., infra notes 8-10. See generally Joseph T. Giacino et al., Functional Neuroimaging Applications
for Assessment and Rehabilitation Planning in Patients with Disorders of Consciousness, 87 ARCHIVES
PHYSICAL MED. REHABILITATION S67, S67 (2006) (reviewing the use of fMRI to “characterize the integrity
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number of important findings. In a 2005 study, several American scientists found that
some individuals in the minimally conscious state may retain widely distributed cortical
systems that have potential for cognitive and sensory function.8 In a 2006 study, several
European scientists concluded that functional neuroimaging might be a means by which
individuals with disorders of consciousness can use their residual cognitive capabilities to
communicate their thoughts to those around them.9 And, in a 2007 study, scientists from
China and Belgium suggested that traditional behavioral assessments can miss cerebral
processing that might herald short-term improvement.10
In light of these findings, many scientists have strongly emphasized the need for
additional neuroimaging research into disorders of consciousness,11 characterizing the
conduct of such studies as morally imperative.12 On the other hand, institutional review
boards (IRBs) charged with approving research protocols, scientific journals deciding
whether to publish study results, and federal agencies that disburse grant money have
limited the conduct, publication, and funding of consciousness investigations based on
ethical and legal concerns.13 Although several issues have been raised, perhaps the two
most prominent relate to the relationship between informed consent and neuroimaging
¶4

of residual cortical networks and . . . search for neural evidence of cognitive function in patients with
disorders of consciousness.”).
8
Nicholas D. Schiff et al., fMRI Reveals Large Scale Activation in Minimally Conscious Patients, 64
NEUROLOGY 514, 514 (2005).
9
Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313 SCIENCE 1402, 1402 (2006).
10
H.B. Di et al., Cerebral Response to Patient’s Own Name in the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious
States, 68 NEUROLOGY 895, 898 (2007).
11
See, e.g., Joy Hirsch, Raising Consciousness, 115 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1102, 1103 (2005)
(“[A]ccelerated research efforts focused on both investigations of consciousness and disorders of
consciousness, as well as resolution of the many obstacles to performing the research, could bring about a
‘quantum leap’ in advantages for informed clinical practice serving severely brain-injured patients.”);
Steven Laureys et al., Brain Function in Coma, Vegetative State, and Related Disorders, 3 LANCET
NEUROLOGY 537, 544 (2004) (“Severe brain damage represents an immense social and economic problem
that warrants further research. Unconscious, minimally conscious, and locked-in patients deserve special
procedural protections. However, it is important to stress that they are also at risk of being denied therapy
that may be life-saving if clinical research cannot be done on these patient groups.”); see also Steven
Laureys, Eyes Open, Brain Shut, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May 2007, at 32, 37 (“We have learned much
from new imaging techniques that measure neural activity in brain-damaged patients, but more research is
needed before scientists can use functional neuroimaging to confirm a diagnosis of the vegetative state and
to help in the prognosis and treatment of this devastating medical condition.”).
12
Douglas Steinberg, Consciousness Is Missing—and So Is Research, 6 EMBO Rep. 1009, 1011 (2005)
(“Therefore, some observers see a moral imperative, not just an ethical trap, in the study of consciousness
disorders.”). See also Benedict Carey, Signs of Awareness Seen in Brain-Injured Patients, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2005 (quoting Columbia neurologist Joy Hirsch’s statement that the failure to conduct additional
neuroimaging research is “unconscionable”).
13
Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1009 (identifying several legal and ethical concerns); Laureys et al., Brain
Function, supra note 11, at 544 (“Nonetheless, researchers studying these patients have been refused
grants, ethics committee approval, and research publication; these decisions tend to be made on the basis
that studies of patients who cannot provide consent are unethical.”). See generally Marcia Angell,
Editorial Responsibility: Protecting Human Rights by Restricting Publication of Unethical Research in
THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 276, 281
(George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds. 1992) (discussing the emerging consensus that editors of
scientific journals should not publish clearly unethical research).
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risks and benefits.14 Some believe that functional neuroimaging studies do not directly
benefit individuals with disorders of consciousness, which may cause legal risks-tobenefits balancing tests15 to balance in favor of no research.16 Others focus on the
inability of individuals with disorders of consciousness to consent to their own research
participation, thus implicating ethical and legal principles relating to voluntary and
informed consent.17
¶5
To further confuse matters, the proper interpretation of relevant ethical and legal
principles, including the relationship between neuroimaging research risks and benefits
and surrogate consent to research involving adults, is not clear. In the United States,
neither federal nor most state laws provide a nuanced definition of “research benefit.”18
When we balance research risks and benefits, do we consider only long-term, grand-scale
therapeutic benefits? What about short-term clinical improvements, such as a change
from the vegetative to the minimally conscious state? What about the benefit of
diagnostic clarity? Federal law also does not specifically address the issue of consent to
research on behalf of adults with disorders of consciousness (or even adults with other
decisional impairments, including severe psychiatric conditions and developmental
disabilities),19 and state law in this area varies, if it exists at all.20 The lack of federal
14

See infra Part I(E) (discussing these concerns in more detail).
45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2007) (requiring the risks of human subjects research to be “reasonable in
relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may
reasonably be expected to result.”).
16
Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1009. See infra Part I(E), for a brief discussion of the legal and ethical
concerns frequently raised by institutional review boards, scientific journals, and funding agencies, and
infra Part III, for an analysis of these issues.
17
45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(4) (2007) (requiring scientists conducting human subjects research to seek
informed consent from each prospective subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative); id. §
46.116 (“Except as provided elsewhere in this policy, no investigator may involve a human being as a
subject in research covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed
consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative.”).
18
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2007) (the definition section of the Common Rule, which does not define the
word benefit); id. § 46.111(a)(2) (stating simply that research risks must be reasonable in relation to
“anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be
expected to result. In evaluating risks and benefits, the IRB should consider only those risks and benefits
that may result from the research (as distinguished from risks and benefits of therapies subjects would
receive even if not participating in the research.)”; Nancy M. P. King, Defining and Describing Benefit
Appropriately in Clinical Trials, 28 J. L MED. & ETHICS 332, 332 (2000) (“The Common Rule actually
doesn’t say much about benefit.”); Jonathan Moreno, Regulation of Research on the Decisionally Impaired:
History and Gaps in the Current Regulatory System, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (1998) (“The
[National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research’s]
recommendations were virtually silent about what constitutes ‘benefit’ to the subject . . . ”).
19
A decisional impairment may manifest itself for one or more reasons, including a psychiatric condition,
developmental disability, dementia, use of drugs and alcohol, and severe illness, just to name a few. The
law tends to refer to individuals with decisional impairments as “incompetent” or “incapacitated.” In this
Article, I will use the phrase “decisional impairment” as opposed to “incompetence” or “incapacity”
because decisional impairment is the reason why a particular individual might not be. See generally infra
Part II(D) (examining the development of federal law governing human subjects research and explaining its
failure to address research involving adults with decisional impairments).
20
See Moreno, supra note 18, at 14 (“The states are a crazy quilt of regulation in this area, with most
having no rules that clearly apply to this group while some are quite restrictive.”); infra Part II(E)
(examining the development of state law governing human subjects research).
15
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guidance and the patchwork of state law can make it difficult for American scientists,
IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies to agree on an applicable regulatory
framework, especially when the research may be conducted in a laboratory located in one
city but will draw patients who are residents of neighboring states.21
¶6
The result of this confusion is a chasm, or perhaps a perceived chasm, between
scientists, who may appear to be overstepping ethical and legal boundaries in their pursuit
of knowledge and diagnostic clarity even though they have expressly considered the
ethical and legal implications of their work,22 and ethics committees, scientific journals,
and funding agencies, which are charged with protecting human subjects and publishing
and funding only ethical and legal protocols but do not have black-and-white rules to
guide their efforts.23 This article attempts to bridge this chasm. Because I think that this
chasm (real or perceived) lacks balance and subtlety, I attempt to interpret neuroimaging
research, ethics, and law in the same dimension, rather than assuming that neuroimaging
research, ethics, and law are necessarily in conflict.24

In Part I, I will introduce the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging as a
tool in the investigation of disorders of consciousness and examine three neuroimaging
research protocols involving individuals in vegetative and minimally conscious states.25
My aim is to familiarize the reader with the ways in which scientists use functional
neuroimaging to study disorders of consciousness, the knowledge that is expected to
result from these studies, the benefits (if any) that may accrue to the research subjects, the
persons who consent to research participation on behalf of the subjects, the process for
obtaining consent, and any specific procedures that may have been established to protect
the subjects’ safety and welfare during their research participation. As you read Part I,
think about any tensions, real or perceived, between the scientific goals of pursuing
knowledge, obtaining diagnostic clarity, and predicting short-term clinical improvement
and society’s need to protect the health and welfare of human subjects, especially
subjects who may not be able to protect themselves.
¶7

¶8
In Part II, I provide an abbreviated history of human subjects research involving
individuals with decisional impairments as well as the development of relevant
American26 ethical and legal human-subjects protections. These protections emerged
after it was discovered that scientists recruited individuals with psychiatric disorders and

21
See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1010 (describing an institutional review board’s attempt to stop a
research protocol involving individuals with disorders of consciousness because the individuals could not
consent to their own research participation, as well as the scientist’s successful defense, which was that the
patients resided in states that permit proxy consent).
22
See, e.g., Fins, supra note 3, at 23 (“bioethicists need to grapple with the imponderables, both theoretical
and practical, that attend to disorders of consciousness.”).
23
See infra Part II(D) (discussing the lack of federal guidance with respect to research involving adults
with decisional impairments).
24
See Chris Gastmans, Introduction, in BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMANITY: THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGY ON HEALTH CARE ETHICS 9 (2002) (taking a similar approach to the perceived relationship
between technology and health care).
25
See infra Part I.
26
A cross-country comparison of human subjects protections is worthwhile although beyond the scope of
this Article.
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developmental disabilities into risky experiments unrelated to their conditions.27 As you
read Part II, think about whether protections developed as a result of ethically
questionable studies involving individuals with psychiatric conditions and developmental
disabilities are, or should be, applicable to studies involving patients in the vegetative and
minimally conscious states.
In Part III, I examine whether additional neuroimaging research into disorders of
consciousness is a moral imperative or an ethical and legal failure. I analyze in detail the
relationship between and among the risks of neuroimaging research in a consciously
disordered population, the reported therapeutic and diagnostic benefits, and the
knowledge that may be expected to result. I conclude by calling for a federal regulation
(or, barring a federal regulation, uniform state laws) that addresses surrogate consent to
human subjects research involving individuals with decisional impairments.
¶9

¶ 10
A note about my language choices in this article: The use of words and phrases
in particular orders can reflect negative and disparaging attitudes about individuals with
physical and mental disabilities.28 For decades, society has referred to individuals with
disabilities by their disability first and their individuality second.29 One guiding principle
to maintain the integrity of individuals as whole human beings is to avoid language that
implies that a person as a whole is disabled by identifying the individual first, then her
condition. “An individual with a disability,” “an individual with a disorder of
consciousness,” or “an individual in the vegetative state” is preferable to “a disabled
individual,” “a consciously disordered individual,” or “a vegetative individual,” although
the latter phrases are less bulky. I have made a concerted effort to adhere to these
principles, although I do use four acronyms, including disorder of consciousness (DOC),
locked-in syndrome (LIS), minimally conscious state (MCS), and vegetative state (VS) to
streamline my sentences. In addition, it is technically correct to refer to “a patient who
has a DOC,” “a patient who has LIS,” “a patient who is in the MCS,” and “a patient who
is in the VS”; however, I will delete the phrases “who has” and “who is in the” and just
use “a patient with DOC,” “a patient with LIS,” “a patient in MCS,” and “a patient in
VS” to further streamline my sentences.

II.

NEUROIMAGING RESEARCH INTO DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
A. Functional Neuroimaging and Disorders of Consciousness: An Overview

One of the fastest growing scientific fields in terms of the numbers of scientists
and the knowledge being gained is neuroscience.30 Neuroscience is devoted to the
scientific study of the nervous system, including its structure, function, development,
¶ 11

27

See infra Parts II(A)-(C).
See, e.g., American Psychiatric Association, Committee on Disability Issues in Psychology, Guidelines
for Non-Handicapping Language in APA Journals, http://apastyle.apa.org/disabilities.html (last visited July
16, 2007).
29
Id.
30
JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 3 (2006).
28
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genetics, biochemistry, physiology, pharmacology, and pathology.31 “In recent years,
both the scope of neuroscience and the methodologies employed by neuroscientists have
broadly expanded, from biochemical and genetic analysis of dynamics of individual
nerve cells and their molecular constituents to the imaging of both brain structure and
function.”32 Some believe that the ability of modern neuroimaging techniques to image
brain structure and function is one of the most significant neuroscientific achievements in
recent history.33 This article focuses on neuroscientific investigations involving one
particular type of functional neuroimaging technology—functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI)—to image the brain function of individuals with DOCs.
¶ 12
Although fMRI is in only its second decade, scientists already have conducted
tens of thousands of human subjects research studies using the technology, which
identifies localized changes in blood oxygenation that occur in the brain when an
individual performs an active or a passive mental task.34 Scientists use fMRI not only to
map sensory, motor, and cognitive function but also to study the neural correlates of a
range of physical and mental conditions, behaviors, characteristics, and preferences.35
Because fMRI is a powerful method of imaging human brain function, especially
impaired brain function,36 many scientists are interested in imaging the brains of
individuals with DOCs.37
¶ 13
In a typical fMRI experiment, scientists assign subjects one or more active or
passive control and experimental tasks and scan their brains during the performance of
such tasks.38 fMRI captures in images the different blood-oxygenation-level-dependent
(BOLD) contrasts that result from the control and experimental tasks.39 By subtracting
the control images from the experimental images, scientists create “maps” of the brain
31

See id. at 17.
Id. See also Peter Woodruff, Imaging the Brain: Clinical and Research Implications for
Neuropsychiatry, in BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMANITY: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON HEALTH
CARE ETHICS 145, 147-50 (Chris Gastmans ed., 2002) (providing an overview of structural and functional
imaging of the brain).
33
WALTER GLANNON, BIOETHICS AND THE BRAIN 45 (2007).
34
David G. Norris, Principles of Magnetic Resonance Assessment of Brain Function, 23 J. MAGNETIC
RESONANCE IMAGING 794, 794-95 (2006); David Dobbs, Hard Science or “Technicolor Phrenology?”:
The Controversy over fMRI, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MIND, Apr. 2005, available at
http://daviddobbs.net/page2/page6/page6.html (last visited July 9, 2007). See generally Stacey A. Tovino,
Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism? 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415,
Parts II and III (2007) (thoroughly reviewing the history of fMRI and its current clinical, research, and
social applications).
35.
See Tovino, supra note 34, at n.198-226; MORENO, supra note 30, at 98 (“Many . . . projects make use of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), one of the most exciting windows into the black box.”).
36
See, e.g., Judy Illes et al., Ethical and Practical Considerations in Managing Incidental Findings in
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 3 BRAIN & COGNITION 358, 358 (2002); Judy Illes, Ethical
Issues at the Intersection of Imaging and Genomics, Presentation at the Princeton University Symposium:
Politics of Biomedical Research: Issues, Information and Policy Decision-Making (Mar. 28, 2003).
37
Laureys et al., Brain Function, supra note 11, at 537 (noting the frequency with which functional
neuroimaging is providing new insights into cerebral activity in patients with severe brain damage).
38.
Judy Illes & Eric Racine, Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by Genetics, 5 AM.
J. BIOETHICS 2, 5, 7. In the case of patients with disorders of consciousness, the tasks assigned are passive
stimulations. Giacino et al., supra note 7, at S70.
39
See Illes & Racine, supra note 38.
32
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showing the areas to which a surplus of oxygenated blood flowed in response to the
performance of the experimental tasks.40 Scientists then interpret these maps as revealing
which parts of the brain are implicated by the performance of particular mental tasks or
the presentation of particular stimuli.
¶ 14
One area of fMRI research involves the study of DOCs that may follow a stroke,
head trauma, or other complex injury to the central nervous system.41 The meaning of
“consciousness” (and, hence, “DOCs”) is widely debated.42 In this article, I adopt a
clinical neuroscience approach and use the word “consciousness” to refer to an
individual’s wakefulness and her awareness of self and environment.43 Individuals who
have disordered consciousness may lack any evidence of consciousness, as in coma, or
may exhibit limited or inconsistent consciousness, as in the MCS.44 A brief review of
three disorders of consciousness (coma, VS, and MCS) as well as the LIS is necessary
before proceeding.45
¶ 15
A coma is a state of sustained pathologic unconsciousness in which an
individual’s eyes remain closed and the individual cannot be aroused.46 Individuals in a
coma display no evidence of awareness of themselves or their environment, no
purposeful motor activity, no behavioral response to command, and no evidence of
language comprehension or expression.47 Individuals in a coma usually transition to the
VS or the MCS within two to four weeks.48
¶ 16

The VS is a clinical condition of complete unawareness of the self and

40

Id.; Jeffrey R. Binder & Stephen M. Rao, Human Brain Mapping with Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, in LOCALIZATION AND NEUROIMAGING IN NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 185, 193 (Andrew Kertesz ed.,
1994); Donald Kennedy, Neuroimaging: Revolutionary Research Tool or a Post-Modern Phrenology? AM.
J. BIOETHICS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 19.
41
Hirsch et al., supra note 3. See generally Stacey Tovino & William J. Winslade, A Primer on the Law
and Ethics of Treatment, Research, and Public Policy in the Context of Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, 14
ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, Part II (2005) (examining disorders of consciousness that may follow traumatic
brain injury).
42
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
43
There is no shortage of definitions of the word consciousness in the scientific, philosophical, and law
literatures. See, e.g., Laureys et al., Self-Consciousness, supra note 1 at 2 (“There is at present no
satisfactory, universally accepted definition of human consciousness. . . . For the purposes of clinical
neurosciences, consciousness consists of two basis elements: arousal (i.e., wakefulness, vigilance or level
of consciousness) and awareness of environment and of self (i.e., content of consciousness).”); Laureys,
Neural Correlate, supra note 1, at 556 (“Consciousness has two main components: wakefulness and
awareness.”). See generally Alain Morin, Levels of Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Comparison and
Integration of Various Views, available at http://www.societyofrobots.com/robottheory/selfawareness_review.pdf (last visited July 10, 2007) (comparing and integrating a number of views regarding
consciousness and self-awareness).
44
See MOHONK REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
45
See generally Laureys et al., Brain Function, supra note 11, at 537-46 (reviewing the nosological criteria
and functional neuroanatomical basis for brain death, coma, vegetative state, minimally conscious state,
and locked-in state).
46
Joseph D. Giacino, Disorders of Consciousness, Recent Scientific Advances and Ethical Implications,
PowerPoint Presentation, Slide 7, 2nd TBI Interagency Conference, Bethesda, Maryland, Mar. 9, 2006,
available at http://www.tbi-interagency.org/pdf/jgiacino_disorders.pdf (last visited July 10, 2007).
47
Id. at Slide 8.
48
Id.
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environment accompanied by sleep-wake cycles with either complete or partial
preservation of hypothalamic and brainstem autonomic functions.49 Diagnostic criteria
for VS thus include no evidence of awareness of self or environment; no evidence of
sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary behavioral responses to visual, auditory,
tactile, or noxious stimuli; and no evidence of language comprehension or expression.50
Scientists often state that the diagnosis of VS relies on the absence of behaviors that
typically accompany conscious awareness.51 Individuals in VS do, however, show
intermittent wakefulness manifested by the presence of sleep-wake cycles,52 sufficiently
preserved hypothalamic and brainstem autonomic functions to permit survival with some
medical and nursing care but usually without mechanical respiration,53 and variably
preserved cranial nerve (pupillary, oculocephalic, corneal, vestibulo-ocular, gag) and
spinal reflexes.54
¶ 17
The MCS is “a condition of severely altered consciousness” in which an
individual demonstrates “minimal but definite behavioral evidence of self or
environmental awareness.”55 Diagnostic criteria for MCS thus include the demonstration
of limited but clearly discernible evidence of self or environmental awareness by one or
more of the following four behaviors: (1) following simple commands; (2) gesturing or
verbally responding “yes” or “no,” regardless of accuracy; (3) intelligible verbalization;
or (4) purposeful behavior, including movements or behaviors that occur in contingent
relation to relevant environmental stimuli and are not due to reflexive activity.56
Examples of qualifying purposeful behavior include appropriate smiling or crying in
response to linguistic or visual content, eye movement that follows a moving object, and
reaching for objects.57 These behaviors may occur inconsistently, but they would need to
be reproducible or sustained long enough to be differentiated from reflexive behavior.58
Unlike the diagnosis of VS, which is based on the absence of evidence of consciousness,
the diagnosis of MCS is based on the presence of specific behavioral manifestations of

49

American Academy of Neurology, Practice Parameters: Assessment and Management of Patients in the
Persistent Vegetative State, 45 NEUROLOGY 1015, 1015 (1995). A VS may be classified as persistent when
it is present at one month after acute traumatic or nontraumatic brain injury and present for at least one
month in degenerative or metabolic disorders or developmental malformations. Id. A VS may be
classified as permanent when it lasts twelve or more months after a traumatic injury or three or more
months after a nontraumatic injury. Giacino, supra note 46, at Slide 13. An individual who is permanently
vegetative is said to have an “exceedingly rare” chance of regaining consciousness. American Academy of
Neurology at 1015. Many scientists suggest avoidance of the persistent and permanent vegetative
classifications and, instead, suggest the phrase vegetative state accompanied by a description of the cause
of injury and the length of time since onset. Giacino, supra note 46, at Slide 12. I will follow this
suggestion here.
50
Hirsch, supra note 11, at 1102; American Academy of Neurology, supra note 49, at 1015.
51
Hirsch, supra note 11, at 1102.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
American Academy of Neurology, supra note 49, at 1015.
55
Joseph D. Giacino, The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic Criteria, 58 NEUROLOGY
349, 350-51 (2002).
56
Id. at 351.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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conscious awareness.59 Patients who are in the upper boundary of MCS may say words
or phrases and gesture and may show evidence of memory, attention, and intention.60
Only when a patient reliably and consistently communicates, however, will the patient be
considered to have emerged from MCS to consciousness.61
¶ 18
Finally, LIS is a condition in which individuals are aware and conscious but
cannot produce speech, limb, or large-scale facial movements.62 Diagnostic criteria for
LIS include: (i) the presence of sustained eye opening; (ii) preserved basic cognitive
abilities; (iii) aphonia or severe hypophonia; (iv) quadriplegia or quadriparesis; and (v) a
primary mode of communication that uses vertical or lateral eye movement or blinking of
the upper eyelid.63 One of the most famous individuals diagnosed with LIS is Jean
Dominique Bauby, the French editor in chief of Elle magazine who, in 1995, suffered a
stroke and fell into a coma.64 When Bauby woke up twenty days later, he was mentally
aware of his surroundings but physically paralyzed except for his ability to move his left
eyelid.65 Bauby raised his left eyelid to communicate with his family, friends, caregivers,
and editor through a “blinking code,” which became his sole means of communication.66
Bauby used this blinking code to dictate his memoir, which was published three days
prior to his death in 1997.67
¶ 19
The ability to differentially diagnose VS, MCS, and LIS is important. The
diagnosis of LIS is necessary to prevent conscious individuals who are physically
paralyzed from being treated as though they are unaware of themselves or their
environment.68 Many scientists believe that differentially diagnosing the VS and the
MCS is also important because patients in MCS may respond better to therapy and may
have a better clinical outcome than patients who remain in VS.69 Although physicians
can diagnose coma with relative ease due to the eyes-shut presentation of the patient,70
the differential diagnoses of VS, MCS, and LIS have been described as more difficult,
more subjective, and more dependent on the skill and experience of the examining
physician, the amount of time the physician spends observing the behavior of the patient,
59

Hirsch, supra note 11, at 1102.
Fins, supra note 3, at 22-24.
61
Id.
62
Steven Laureys et al., The Locked-In Syndrome: What Is It Like to be Conscious but Paralyzed and
Voiceless?, 150 PROGRESS BRAIN RESEARCH 495, 495 (2005).
63
Id. at 497-98. See also Eimear Smith & Mark Delargy, Locked-In Syndrome, 330 BRITISH MED. J. 406,
406 (2005) (providing additional definitions and diagnostic criteria).
64
JEAN DOMINIQUE BAUBY, THE DIVING BELL AND THE BUTTERFLY: A MEMOIR OF LIFE IN DEATH (1998)
(chronicling Bauby’s thoughts on his locked-in state and hospital stay, as well as his family life and career
before his stroke).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See, e.g., Laureys et al., supra note 62, at 499 (“[T]he [LIS] diagnosis may be missed and the patient may
erroneously be considered as being in a coma, vegetative state, or akinetic mustism . . . . Most distressingly,
the time elapsed between brain insult and LIS diagnosis was on average 2.5 months (78 days). Several
patients were not diagnosed for more than 4 years.”) (internal references omitted).
69
Huntoon, supra note 5, at 35; Douglas I. Katz, Minimally Conscious State, KURZWEILAI.NET, available
at http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0161.html (last visited July 16, 2007).
70
Pickett Hauber, supra note 5.
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the physical ability of the patient to respond to a particular stimulus, and a number of
other factors.71 LIS, for example, can be difficult to diagnose because patients may
emerge to LIS from coma after variable and substantial delays.72 VS and MCS can be
difficult to distinguish due to the subjectivity traditionally involved in determining
whether there is some evidence of self- or environmental awareness.73
Because of these and other challenges, scientists have been studying whether
fMRI and other functional neuroimaging technologies can provide evidence of cerebral
networks or an internal form of “awareness” that is not externally observable.74 To
illustrate these efforts, I review three fMRI studies the results of which have been
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals during the past four years. The first study
involves individuals in MCS, the second study involves individuals in VS, and the third
study involves individuals in both VS and MCS.
¶ 20

B. fMRI Study 1: Large-Scale Network Activation in Patients in MCS
In one fMRI study published in Neurology in February 2005, scientists at
Cornell University, Columbia University, Georgetown University Medical Center, and
the JFK Johnson Rehabilitation Institute hypothesized that patients in MCS may retain
active cerebral networks that underlie cognitive function (hereinafter, fMRI Study 1).75
To test their hypothesis, the scientists used fMRI to scan the brains of two adult patients
who had severe brain injuries that led to MCS and the brains of seven healthy adult
volunteers.76 The first patient in MCS had experienced a spontaneous bleed in the left
temporoparietal region of his brain.77 The highest-level behavioral responses that
physicians observed for this patient included one-step command following, inconsistent
identification of objects through eye gaze, and intelligible single-word verbalizations.78
The second patient in MCS had experienced a blunt trauma to the right frontal region of
his brain.79 The highest-level behavioral responses that physicians observed for the
second patient included occasional verbalization and an inconsistent ability to follow
¶ 21

71

Huntoon, supra note 5, at 35; Katz, supra note 69.
See Smith & Delargy, supra note 63, at 407.
73
See, e.g., Laureys et al., supra note 6, at 521 (“Movements that appear to be volitional may actually be
reflexive in nature and vice versa. Complicating matters further, patients may exhibit behavioral signs of
awareness during one examination and fail to do so on the next.”). See generally Calixto Machado, The
Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic Criteria, NEUROLOGY, June 24, 2002, available at
http://neurology.org/cgi/eletters/58/3/3 (last visited July 16, 2007) (noting the philosophical impossibility
of detecting the subjective dimension of awareness).
74
See, e.g., Di et al., supra note 10, at 895 (“A challenge in the management of severely brain-damaged
patients with altered states of consciousness is the differential diagnosis between the vegetative state (VS)
and the minimally conscious state (MCS), especially for the gray zone separating these clinical entities. . . .
[Our studies showed that] [t]he cerebral responses to patient’s own name spoken by a familiar voice as
measured by fMRI might be a useful tool to preclinically distinguish minimally conscious state–like
cognitive processing in some patients behaviorally classified as vegetative.”); Huntoon, supra note 5, at 35.
75
Schiff et al., supra note 8, at 514-15.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 515.
78
Id.
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Id.
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complex commands.80
¶ 22
By definition, the two patients in MCS were unable to consent to their own
research participation.81 The scientists obtained informed consent to the patients’
research participation from surrogates: “Legally authorized surrogates for both patients
were contacted by medical personnel not directly involved in the current studies.
Informed consent was obtained according to institutional guidelines on two occasions,
allowing for a period of evaluation and opportunity for additional information.”82
¶ 23
During the study, the scientists used fMRI to scan the patients’ brains while
conducting three different passive stimulation activities. First, the scientists gently
rubbed the patients’ palms and fingers with a coarse-textured plastic surface, an activity
selected because of the patients’ inflexible hand positions.83 Second, the scientists placed
headphones on the patients and played an audio narrative of familiar events spoken by
persons familiar to the patients.84 Third, the scientists played through the same
headphones the same audio narrative, but this time in reverse. Here, it was assumed that
the backwards statements would be recognizable as speech but that the linguistic content
of the speech would not be recognizable.85 The scientists performed each activity twice
for a total of six passive stimulations per patient in MCS.86

The scientists found that the forward playing of the audio narratives elicited
activity in regions of the brains (the superior and middle temporal gyrus) of the two
patients in MCS and that the seven healthy volunteers demonstrated similar activations
when comparably stimulated.87 When the scientists played the audio narratives in
reverse, however, they found “markedly reduced” responses in the brains of the two
patients in MCS as compared with the brains of the seven healthy volunteers.88 The
scientists suggested, therefore, that the two patients in MCS had “reduced engagement for
linguistically meaningless stimuli.”89 After stating that they had presented the first fMRI
maps of neural responses to tactile stimulation and language processing of individuals in
MCS,90 the scientists further suggested that individuals in MCS may retain widely
distributed cortical systems with potential for cognitive and sensory function despite the
individuals’ inability to follow simple instructions or communicate reliably.91
¶ 24

¶ 25
The same day the study was published in Neurology, New York Times reporter
Benedict Carey suggested to millions of readers that patients in MCS may be, literally
and in the lay sense of the word, “aware” of what goes on around them: “Thousands of
80

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 514, 516-17.
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Id.
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brain-damaged people who are treated as if they are almost completely unaware may in
fact hear and register what is going on around them but be unable to respond, a new
brain-imaging study suggests.”92 Carey also quoted the opinion of one of the study
authors that it was “morally imperative” to pursue fMRI research involving individuals in
MCS:
The most consequential thing about this is that we have opened a door, we
have found an objective voice for these patients, which tells us they have
some cognitive ability in a way they cannot tell us themselves. . . . [The
patients are] more human than we imagined in the past, and it is
unconscionable not to aggressively pursue research efforts to evaluate
them and develop therapeutic techniques.93
Following the publication of the study, many other scientists agreed that the study
findings warranted further research in this area.94 Others, however, found the study to be
more suggestive than conclusive and clarified that the results did not mean that patients in
MCS were likely to recover or that treatment was possible.95
C. fMRI Study 2: Detecting Awareness in the VS
¶ 26
In a second fMRI study published in Science in September 2006, scientists at the
University of Cambridge and University of Liège went one step further by hypothesizing
that fMRI might provide a means for detecting not only preserved brain function but also
conscious awareness in individuals diagnosed as vegetative using standard clinical testing
(hereinafter, fMRI Study 2).96 To test their hypothesis, the scientists proposed to use
fMRI to scan the brain of a twenty-three-year-old woman who had suffered a severe
traumatic brain injury and whom a multidisciplinary clinical team had subsequently
diagnosed as vegetative.97 Because the woman could not consent to her own research
participation, the scientists obtained consent to the woman’s research participation from
her next of kin.98
¶ 27

During the study, the scientists gave the woman spoken instructions to perform

92

Carey, supra note 12.
Id.
94
See, e.g., Chad H. Moritz, fMRI Reveals Large-Scale Activation in Minimally Conscious Patients,
NEUROLOGY, May 3, 2005, available at http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/64/3/514#2651 (last visited
July 12, 2007).
95
Carey, supra note 12. Following the study’s publication, disability advocates from the Not Dead Yet
organization also referred to the study in their public cry for a nationwide moratorium on the withholding
and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from individuals in VS. The theory behind the moratorium is
that physicians should not withhold or withdraw nutrition, hydration, and other therapies from individuals
who are, in the organization’s own words, not dead yet. See How Much More Evidence Do We Need?
Disability Activists Call for Moratorium on Starvation and Dehydration, NOT DEAD YET, Feb. 14, 2005,
available at http://www.notdeadyet.org/docs/moratoriumPR021405.html (last visited July 9, 2007).
96
Owen et al., supra note 9, at 1402.
97
Id.; Adrian M. Owen, Summary: Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, http://www.mrccbu.cam.ac.uk/~adrian/Site/Summary.html (last visited July 12, 2007).
98
E-mail from Dr. Martin Coleman, MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, to Stacey Tovino (July 13,
2007, 03:42 A.M. CST) (on file with author).
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two mental imagery tasks.99 The first instruction was to imagine playing a game of
tennis.100 The second instruction was to imagine visiting all of the rooms of her house,
starting from the front door.101 During the periods when the scientists asked the woman
to imagine playing tennis, they observed significant activity in an area of her brain known
as the supplemental motor area.102 During the periods when the scientists asked the
woman to imagine herself walking through her home, they observed significant activity
in different regions of the brain, including the parahippocampal gyrus, the posterior
parietal cortex, and the lateral premotor cortex.103 When the scientists compared the
woman’s neural responses with the responses of healthy volunteers who performed the
same imagery tasks, the responses were indistinguishable.104 The scientists concluded
that although the woman fulfilled the traditional clinical criteria for VS, she was, in
scientific terms, consciously aware of herself and her surroundings:
[T]his patient retained the ability to understand spoken commands and to
respond to them through her brain activity, rather than through speech or
movement. Moreover, her decision to cooperate with the authors by
imagining particular tasks when asked to do so represents a clear act of
intention, which confirmed beyond any doubt that she was consciously
aware of herself and her surroundings.105
The scientists also stated that fMRI might be a method by which other patients in VS and
MCS could “use their residual cognitive capabilities to communicate their thoughts to
those around them by modulating their own neural activity.”106
Again writing for the New York Times, although this time on page A1, Benedict
Carey reported, “A severely brain-damaged woman in an unresponsive, vegetative state
showed clear signs of conscious awareness on brain imaging tests.”107 Carey quoted a
Cornell scientist, who was not involved in the study, as stating that the study provided
“‘knock-down, drag-out’ evidence for conscious activity, but that it was not clear
‘whether we’ll see this in one out of 100 vegetative patients, or one out of 1,000, or ever
again.’”108 The Times write-up included other, more cautious quotations:
¶ 28

The imaging techniques used in the new study could help identify which
patients are most likely to emerge—once the tests are studied in larger
99

Owen et al., supra note 9, at 1402.
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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Id.
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Id. See also Patient in Vegetative State Plays Tennis in Her Head, MRC PRESS RELEASE, Sept. 8, 2006,
available at http://www.mrc.ac.uk/NewsViewsAndEvents/News/MRC002623 (last visited July 9, 2007)
(“This technique may allow us to identify which patients have some level of awareness. . . . Future work
will investigate whether the technique can be used more widely in these patients and whether this discovery
could lead to a way of communicating with some patients who may be aware, but unable to move or
speak.”).
107
Benedict Carey, Vegetative Patient Shows Signs of Awareness, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at
A1.
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numbers of unconscious people. . . . “For now I think what this study does
is to create another shade of gray in the understanding of gray matter.”109
Other scientists were less impressed with the study authors’ conclusions, calling them far
fetched110 and warning of their ethical, social, and other implications: “The question of
conscious awareness in the vegetative state has relevance far beyond the limits of the
neuroscience community, with an impact on individual lives that is hard to calculate. . . .
[I]t is imperative that alternative data interpretations be carefully considered before
making radical inferences.”111
D. fMRI Study 3: Cerebral Responses to Patient’s Own Name
¶ 29
Scientists continue to use fMRI to study disorders of consciousness. In a third
fMRI study published in Neurology in March 2007, scientists from China and Belgium
hypothesized that fMRI might be useful to preclinically distinguish VS and MCS
(hereinafter, fMRI Study 3).112 (Remember, some scientists believe that patients in MCS
may respond better to therapy and ultimately may have a better clinical outcome than
patients who remain in VS.113 Reports of patients in MCS but misdiagnosed as VS for
almost twenty years add fuel to the desire for more accurate diagnoses.114) To test their
hypothesis, the scientists used fMRI to scan and compare the brain activations of seven
patients in VS and four patients in MCS, all but two of whom had experienced traumatic
brain injury.115 Due to the importance of their initial diagnoses, the scientists used
extensive and repeated clinical testing, including five different validated behavioral
scales, to arrive at an initial diagnosis of VS or MCS for each patient.116 Because the
patients were unable to consent to their own research participation, “[i]nformed written
consent was obtained from the families of all patients, and the study was approved by the
Ethics Committee of Zhejiang University School of Medicine.”117

After obtaining family consent, the scientists used headphones to deliver to each
patient a digital recording of the patient’s own name spoken by a familial voice (SONFV), which in this case happened to be a voice of a first-degree family member.118 The
scientists chose SON-FV, a powerful “emotionally laden auditory stimuli,” with the hope
of maximizing their chances of detecting residual brain function.119 During the study, the
scientists scanned the patients’ brains using a block design that incorporated six active
¶ 30

109

Id.
Parashkev Nachev & Masud Husain, Comment on “Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State,”
SCIENCE, Mar. 2, 2007, at 1221a.
111
Id.
112
Di et al., supra note 10, at 895.
113
Huntoon, supra note 5, at 35.
114
GLANNON, supra note 33, at 158-59 (discussing the case of Arkansas resident Terry Wallis who was
misdiagnosed as VS for nineteen years).
115
The scientists initially enrolled five patients in MCS but had to exclude one patient’s data due to her
head movement. Di et al., supra note 10, at 896.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 895-96.
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blocks (during each of which seven SON-FVs were presented) and seven baseline blocks
(during which only the noise of the MRI machine was available).120 Because accurate
MRI scanning requires the patient to lie still, and because patients in VS and MCS have
reflexive and uncontrolled body movements that tend to increase with the noise of the
magnet in the MRI machine, the scientists used special headphones and placed
homemade head-fixation devices on each patient.121
¶ 31
The scientists found that two of the patients in VS failed to show any significant
cerebral activation, three of the patients in VS showed SON-FV-induced activation
within the primary auditory cortex, and two of the patients in VS and all four of the
patients in MCS showed activation not only in the primary auditory cortex but also in
hierarchically higher-order associative temporal areas.122 The scientists conducted
additional behavioral testing at one, two, and three months post-study to examine the
prognostic value of the study123 and found that the two patients in VS who showed the
most widespread activation actually had improved to MCS.124 The scientists opined that
traditional behavioral assessments (assessments without scanning) can miss cerebral
processing that might herald short-term improvement:

In our opinion, these two patients were already with MCS during fMRI
scanning but behavioral signs of consciousness could (even using the best
clinical assessments available) only be shown 3 months later. This
interpretation is in line with previous reports showing unusual activation
of higher order areas (using respectively presentation of familiar faces and
verbal stimuli) followed by clinical recovery some months later. Hence,
fMRI seems to offer a higher sensitivity to identify cognitive processing in
patients emerging from a VS compared to bedside clinical tools.125
The scientists concluded that using fMRI to measure cerebral responses to a
patient’s own name spoken by a familial voice might be a useful method of preclinically
identifying some patients with “minimally conscious state–like cognitive processing.”126
¶ 32

Several scientists who commented on the published study agreed that it added to
the evidence that the brains of some individuals in VS support more cerebral processing
of external stimuli than their behavioral state suggests and that such processing portends
better short-term prognosis.127 They also emphasized, however, that patients with
“minimally conscious–like processing” were still “cognitively devastated” and that endof-life decision making, including decisions to withhold and withdraw life-sustaining
treatment, should not be altered.128 One commentator stated more directly: “None of this
¶ 33
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changes the fact however that most people wouldn’t want to be kept alive artificially in a
MCS either and going from a [persistent] VS to an MCS is no real improvement in the
big scheme of things.”129
E. Practical, Legal, and Ethical Limitations
Throughout this part, I have briefly introduced a few hurdles posed by fMRI
research involving individuals with DOC, including their inability to consent to their own
research participation and their inability to follow instructions to hold still in an MRI
scanner. I would like to expand on these hurdles and introduce a few additional practical,
ethical, legal, and social obstacles to neuroimaging research involving individuals with
DOC. These obstacles include, but certainly are not limited to, the cost of and lack of
funding for neuroimaging studies, the absence of a federal law and a patchwork of state
laws governing surrogate consent for individuals with DOC, and the communication
barriers between and among scientists, reporters, lawyers, ethicists, and other
stakeholders.
¶ 34

¶ 35
Neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC is costly. Imagine a
research project that involves only healthy volunteers who transport themselves to a
research laboratory or other test site, unaccompanied by healthcare personnel, to take a
written psychological test. The healthy volunteers walk, drive, or use public
transportation to transport themselves to the test site; read and complete the written test
under the supervision of the scientists, their study coordinators, graduate students, or
other test proctors; and then transport themselves home. Not all, but certainly some,
research protocols are this easy to coordinate and are relatively inexpensive. But when a
research project involves a patient with DOC, some of whom may be residents of
rehabilitation hospitals or other long-term care facilities, the scientists must arrange and
pay for the safe transport of the patient from the facility to the laboratory, which may
include an ambulance, and must provide any medical support needed by the patient,
which may include monitoring by an intensive care physician during the study.130

Neuroimaging research involving patients with DOC also can be time
consuming and generate a fair amount of unusable data. As mentioned in fMRI Study 3,
many patients in VS and MCS have reflexive and uncontrolled body movements that
increase with the noise of the magnet that lies within the MRI machine.131 Because
accurate MRI results require patients to lie still during the scanning procedure, scientists
may place special noise-reduction headphones and head-fixation devices on their
subjects.132 Even with these devices, some subjects still move their heads too much. In
fMRI Study 3, for example, the scientists initially enrolled seven patients in VS and five
patients in MCS, although they were subsequently forced to exclude data relating to one
patient in MCS who moved her head too much in synchronization with the auditory
¶ 36
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stimuli while she was in the scanner.133 The data had to be thrown away because it was
impossible for the scientists to separate the neural responses that were due to the stimuli
(the audio recording of the patient’s own name spoken by a familial voice) versus the
movement of the patient’s head.134 Other scientists conducting neuroimaging studies
have experienced a failure rate of up to two out of every three patients in MCS who are
scanned.135
¶ 37
Traditional government funding usually does not cover all or even some of these
costs of neuroimaging research in consciously disordered populations. In the United
States, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF),
and other federal agencies do not grant significant funds for the study of DOC.136
Knowing this, some American scientists request funds not from the NIH or NSF but from
disability-based agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Education’s National Institute
on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, which has separate funding for traumaticbrain-injury research.137 European scientists also report difficulty obtaining funding for
their consciousness studies, especially in comparison to their investigations of
Parkinson’s disease and other, more traditional, degenerative neurological conditions.138

Legal and ethical concerns, typically raised by IRBs charged with approving
research protocols, scientific journals deciding whether to publish study results, and
government funding agencies, further limit the conduct and publication of consciousness
investigations.139 In particular, IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies are
concerned (1) that neuroimaging studies do not directly benefit research subjects, which
may cause the risk-to-benefits balancing test140 to balance in favor of no research; (2) that
some functional neuroimaging studies pose more than a minimal risk of injury to
subjects;141 and (3) about the inability of patients with DOC to consent to their own
research participation, which implicates ethical and legal principles relating to voluntary
and informed consent.142 Although fMRI generally is considered minimal risk, other
functional neuroimaging technologies, including positron emission tomography (PET),
¶ 38
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including the criterion that “[i]nformed consent will be sought from each prospective subject or the
subject’s legally authorized representative, in accordance with, and to the extent required by § 46.116.”);
id. § 46.116 (“Except as provided elsewhere in this policy, no investigator may involve a human being as a
subject in research covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed
consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative.”). See generally Richard Smith,
Should the BMJ Reject All Studies that Do Not Include Informed Consent?, 314 BRITISH MED. J. 1059,
1059 (1997) (illustrating the role ethical concerns play in publication decisions made by scientific journals).
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do require the injection of radioactive tracers that are considered riskier.143
¶ 39
“Whether or not these arguments are raised depends on the institution, locality
and country in which a particular study is being evaluated.”144 Some scientists
experience few ethical and legal obstacles in the conduct of their research, while other
scientists encounter them frequently. An IRB reportedly tried to stop the research of
Columbia neurologist Joy Hirsch, one of the authors of fMRI Study 1, two different
times.145 In one of these cases, the IRB reportedly told her that she could not obtain
surrogate (or proxy) consent to the research participation of an individual in VS or
MCS.146 Dr. Hirsch was able to continue her research by proving that her subjects were
residents of states that permit proxy consent.147 But her defense highlights a related
issue, which is that federal law does not specifically address consent to research on behalf
of adults with decisional impairments,148 and state law in this area varies, if it exists at
all.149 The lack of federal guidance and the patchwork of state law can make it difficult
for scientists and their IRBs to agree on an applicable regulatory framework, especially
when the research may be conducted in a laboratory located in one state (e.g., New York)
but will draw patients who are residents of neighboring states (e.g., the Tri-State Area)
and beyond.
¶ 40
Although IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies may attempt to limit
the conduct, publication, and funding of neuroimaging studies involving patients with
DOC, other religious and political organizations, including organizations that oppose
abortion and stem-cell research, support research into DOC.150 The Vatican reportedly
extended an invitation to Belgian neurologist Steven Laureys, one of the authors of fMRI
Studies 2 and 3, because the Vatican liked his PET research findings showing brain
activations in patients in VS who received electric shocks.151 Not Dead Yet, a disability
advocacy group that opposes the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
from patients in VS and MCS, also supports research into DOC, especially when the
study results show more clearly that these patients are not dead yet.152 Indeed, a research
analyst at Not Dead Yet hopes that continued consciousness research will show that
patients in VS and MCS “clearly have significant cognitive activity going on” even
though society may be “writ[ing] them off.”
¶ 41
To further confuse matters, scientists have spoken publicly about their research
findings and their desire to conduct additional research, and these statements have led to
143

Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1009.
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See infra Part III(E).
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Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1009.
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Id. (referring to Steven Laureys et al., Cortical Processing of Noxious Somatosensory Stimuli in the
Persistent Vegetative State, 17 NEUROIMAGE 732, 732 (2002) (measuring changes in regional cerebral
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misunderstandings by some of the nonscientists who read and hear the statements.153 The
scientists’ statements to the media are excited and hopeful and, well, scientific.154 After
all, these individuals spend their lives studying and testing questions at the cutting edges
of their fields. But someone must translate the scientists’ complex research findings into
copy that will be read by the general public.155 Some journalists do not have clinical or
scientific backgrounds and are not necessarily equipped to summarize complex research
studies for laypersons.156 Journalism, which is designed to sell, and the reporting of
scientific findings in peer-reviewed journals, which is supposed to be objective and
dispassionate, also may not be the best of partners. This problem, sometimes called the
problem of “science in public,” can result in journalistic distortion.157 The problem
becomes confounded when lawyers and ethicists, who may become aware of scientific
developments first through the media, make relatively conservative legal and ethical
pronouncements based on statements made in media reports or questions posed by
reporters. In response, scientists attempt to re-explain their research findings back to the
lawyers, ethicists, and media, all the while trying not to engage in therapeutic nihilism,158
on one hand, or “engender[] expectations for the permanently unconscious,” on the
other.159

153

See, e.g., JANE GREGORY & STEVEN MILLER, SCIENCE IN PUBLIC: COMMUNICATION, CULTURE, AND
CREDIBILITY 1 (1998) (“In the last decade or so, scientists have been delivered a new commandment from
on high: thou shalt communicate.”).
154
See, e.g., note 11, supra.
155
See GREGORY & MILLER, supra note 153, at 110.
156
Id. at 108, 116.
157
Fins, supra note 3, at 22-24. For example, a published research study titled “fMRI Reveals Large Scale
Activation in Minimally Conscious Patients” (Schiff et al., supra note 8), which concludes just what its title
suggests, was featured in the New York Times under the headline “Signs of Awareness Seen in BrainInjured Patients.” Carey, supra note 12. The fact that a magnetic resonance imaging scanner identified
significant localized changes in blood oxygenation in patients in MCS who were presented with certain
auditory stimuli, which is a very important scientific finding, does not necessarily mean that these patients
were “aware” in the lay sense of the word. These individuals were not watching TV or using their cell
phones. But we can understand, perhaps, how this distortion occurred. For a science story to be
meaningful and relevant to the public, the story must fall within the scope of what the public normally
thinks about. GREGORY & MILLER, supra note 153, at 110. Although the general public might not think
about localized changes in blood oxygenation that occur in the brain as a result of passive auditory
stimulation (id. at 110-11 (noting that “[s]cience . . . often deals with areas in which people do not engage
as a matter of course . . . ”)), the public does understand what it means to be awake and aware, at least in
the lay sense. Benedict Carey, who wrote the article for the Times, probably selected the word awareness
for his headline to make the article coverage more meaningful and relevant to the average person.
Academics have been studying these and other problems of “science in public” for quite some time. Id. at
ix-x.
158
See Tovino & Winslade, supra note 41, at 30 n.172 (defining therapeutic nihilism as the failure to
recognize the possible benefits of treatment).
159
Fins, supra note 3, at 24. It goes without saying that the language barriers among scientists, reporters,
lawyers, ethicists, and the general public are not insignificant. Each of us is trained in different research
methodologies and in the use of different professional languages that can be misleading to persons
unfamiliar with our professional cultures. See GREGORY & MILLER, supra note 153, at 115-16 (contrasting
the objective and dispassionate scientific language used in formal scientific publications with news
language, which is “immediate, positive, and active”; noting that “news reports often emphasize the
potential applications and outcomes of scientific results, rather than the process by which they were
developed. Emphasizing applications again makes the information seem more certain . . . .”).

Vol. 13

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

No. 2

2008

Tovino, Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of Consciousness

22

¶ 42
To begin to evaluate the seemingly opposing viewpoints of the scientists who
conduct neuroimaging research and the lawyers, ethicists, and others who may be critical
of the research, I provide in Part II an abbreviated history of research involving
individuals with decisional impairments. Part II lays the foundation for Part III, in which
I examine the ethical and legal appropriateness of additional neuroimaging research into
disorders of consciousness.

III.
AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY
DECISIONAL IMPAIRMENTS

OF

RESEARCH INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS

WITH

¶ 43
The ancient and modern history of human subjects research, its ethical
implications, and its regulation in the United States and abroad have been thoroughly
researched and documented elsewhere.160 In this part, I provide an abbreviated history of
medical experimentation involving individuals with psychiatric conditions and
developmental disabilities as well as the development of relevant American161 legal and
ethical human-subjects protections. I review research studies involving individuals with
psychiatric conditions and developmental disabilities for three interrelated reasons. First,
a long and well-documented history of experimentation involving individuals with DOC
does not exist. Second, analogies among the three populations (individuals with
psychiatric conditions, developmental disabilities, and DOC) have, although not without
controversy, been made because individuals in all three groups may have reduced,
limited, or no capacity to make decisions to participate in research.162 Third, the
development of ethical and legal principles governing research participation by
individuals with decisional impairments was attempted after it was discovered that
scientists recruited individuals with psychiatric conditions and developmental disabilities
into risky experiments, many of which were unrelated to their conditions.

A. Ancient and Modern Research Trends
¶ 44

If “experimentation in man for scientific purposes is as old as recorded

160

For reviews of the modern history of human-subjects research and the development of human-subjects
protections, see, for example, MARGARET L. EATON & DONALD KENNEDY, INNOVATION IN MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY: ETHICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 37-46 (2007); LAINIE FRIEDMAN ROSS, CHILDREN IN
MEDICAL RESEARCH: ACCESS VERSUS PROTECTION 12-43 (2006); JONATHAN MORENO, IS THERE AN
ETHICIST IN THE HOUSE? 109-52 (2005); CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF
RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 3-244 (2005); CYNTHIA MCGUIRE DUNN & GARY L. CHADWICK,
PROTECTING VOLUNTEERS IN RESEARCH: A MANUAL FOR INVESTIGATIVE SITES 13-43 (3rd ed. 2004)
(same); HAROLD Y. VANDERPOOL, THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS: FACING THE
21ST CENTURY 1-144 (1996); GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 1-275 (2002); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM
L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 151-232 (1986).
161
See supra note 26.
162
In Part III, I examine the differences between early twentieth-century experimentation involving
individuals with psychiatric conditions and developmental disabilities and recent neuroimaging
investigations into DOC. I argue that the ethical concerns arising from the former studies are not present to
a significant degree in the latter. Cf. Joseph J. Fins, Constructing an Ethical Stereotaxy for Severe Brain
Injury: Balancing Risks, Benefits and Access, 4 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 323, 325 (2003) (noting the
salient differences between older psychosurgery experiments and current neuromodulation investigations).
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history,”163 then experimentation in captive and vulnerable men, including criminals and
individuals with mental disorders, is almost as old. Criminals were considered fair game
for medical experiments by ancient Persian Kings, the Ptolemies in Egypt, and Fallopius
in Pisa during the Renaissance, in part because of their captivity, which eased the
administrative burden associated with their recruitment.164 Individuals with mental
disorders also were used in ancient experiments, perhaps because they were considered
expendable. A Persian prince at the time of Avicenna told new physicians, “[I]f you wish
to gain experience and a reputation you must experiment freely, but you had better not
choose people of high rank or political importance for your subjects.”165 Perhaps this
philosophy opened the door for twentieth-century scientists to enroll individuals with
psychiatric conditions and developmental disabilities in medical experiments.166
An early twentieth-century example is British researcher William Fletcher’s
beriberi experiment. In the early 1900s, beriberi (a nervous disorder caused by thiamine
deficiency) was particularly problematic, and scientists were actively studying methods
of prevention.167 To that end, in 1905, Fletcher identified a captive population of
research subjects among the patients of a lunatic asylum in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and
assigned each patient a number.168 The odd-numbered patients were given the regular
hospital diet.169 The even-numbered patients were given rice cured with Vitamin B.170
Forty-three of the 120 patients assigned to the regular hospital diet developed beriberi,
eighteen of whom later died.171 Only two of the patients assigned to the cured rice
developed beriberi, neither of whom died.172 Little attention was given to Fletcher’s
decision to use a confined population of individuals with psychiatric conditions to
conduct his experiment.
¶ 45

¶ 46
The practice of enrolling vulnerable individuals in medical experiments
continued throughout the early twentieth century. In about 1915, Austrian researchers
injected tuberculosis bacilli and alcohol into individuals with mental disorders.173 In
1917, Austrian physician Julius Wagner-Jauregg inoculated patients, diagnosed as insane
by virtue of neurosyphilis, with malaria parasites—an experiment that proved successful
and earned him the Nobel Prize in Medicine or Physiology in 1927.174 The use of
patients with mental disorders as research subjects apparently was not uncommon in the
early 1900s.175
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HENRY K. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL: HUMAN STUDIES x (1970).
Henry K. Beecher, Experimentation in Man, 169 J. M. ED. ASS’N 461 (1959); BEECHER, supra note 163,
at 5.
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BEECHER, supra note 163, at 5.
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Id.
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Id. at 10.
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¶ 47
Experimentation involving patients with mental disorders continued throughout
the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. During the Second World War, the federal
Committee on Medical Research of the White House’s Office of Scientific Research and
Development approved the use of Mississippi insane-asylum patients in research
protocols designed to investigate influenza.176 In 1949, Portuguese psychiatrist and
neurosurgeon Egas Moniz won the Nobel Prize for his leucotomy experiments, during
which he removed the frontal lobe of very anxious and aggressive patients with mental
disorders to test whether surgery would lessen their anxiety and frustration.177 Although
Moniz used vulnerable research subjects in his experiments, his aim was to ease the
symptoms that made them vulnerable in the first place. 178 In some cases, he
succeeded.179

Not all twentieth-century research projects involving vulnerable populations
were designed to improve the subjects’ psychiatric or developmental conditions.
Although the modern history of human subjects research contains dozens of examples of
medical experiments that harmed vulnerable patients, I will review two particular
experiments that I believe illustrate, to varying extents, some of the concerns raised by
IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies with respect to neuroimaging research of
DOC. These experiments include the U.S. Army’s chemical warfare research, conducted
in the early 1950s180 and the hepatitis experiments conducted at Willowbrook Hospital
from the late 1950s to the early 1970s.181 The relevant legal and ethical concerns include,
but certainly are not limited to, the (un)reasonableness of the research risks in relation to
the expected benefits, scientists’ use of captive, vulnerable populations for medical
experimentation, and the lack of first-person informed consent (or continued consent) to
research participation.
¶ 48

B. Harold Blauer and the Army’s Chemical Warfare Research
¶ 49
In the mid-1900s, the U.S. Army became interested in the use of hallucinogenic
compounds as potential chemical warfare agents, and in 1951, the Army Chemical Center
proposed to study the effect of psychochemical agents on various confined populations,
including patients at the New York State Psychiatric Institute (“Psychiatric Institute”).182
According to the Army Chemical Center’s research proposal, “new technical data will be
derived . . . which will provide a firmer basis for the utilization of psychochemical agents
both for offensive use as sabotage weapons and for protection against them.”183 That
same year, the Army Chemical Corps (“Army”) and the Psychiatric Institute entered into
two contracts for the psychological and psychiatric investigation of potential chemical

176

DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS
TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 87 (1991).
177
MORENO, supra note 160, at 157.
178
Id.
179
Id.
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See infra Part II.B.
181
See infra Part II.C.
182
Barrett v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
183
Id. (ellipsis in original).
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warfare agents.184 Pursuant to the contracts, the Army would give chemical derivates of
mescaline, a hallucinogenic alkaloid of the phenethylamine class, to the Psychiatric
Institute. The Psychiatric Institute would, in turn, inject the derivatives into a group of
patients and report the findings back to the Army every three months.185
¶ 50
Around the same time, forty-two-year-old Harold Blauer, a tennis professional
and former ranked tennis player,186 voluntarily admitted himself to the Psychiatric
Institute for treatment for his severe depression, which was later diagnosed as pseudoneurotic schizophrenia.187 Under the care of Dr. George Schnack, one of the therapists at
the Psychiatric Institute, Blauer’s condition steadily improved.188 A few weeks before
Blauer was set to be released, the Psychiatric Institute scheduled him to receive a series
of mescaline injections pursuant to its research contract with the Army.189 The mescaline
injections for which Blauer was scheduled were completely unrelated to his psychiatric
condition.190 The injections were not intended to serve a diagnostic or therapeutic
purpose; instead, their sole purpose was to help the Army gather data about the use of
mescaline derivatives as potential chemical warfare agents.191 According to a judicial
opinion published almost thirty-five years following the experiment, Blauer reportedly
was aware that the drugs he would be given were experimental in the sense that they did
not come from a pharmacy; however, he was unaware that their purpose was not to help
him but, instead, to help develop chemical warfare agents.192 Blauer reportedly was not
asked to give written informed consent to his own research participation, although he
gave oral consent, at least initially.193
¶ 51
Blauer received one injection per week for five weeks in December 1952 and
January 1953.194 According to study records made immediately prior to his first
injection, Blauer was “very apprehensive” about taking part in the study, and
“considerable persuasion [was] required” to make him accept the first injection.195 The
chemical reportedly caused a feeling of pressure in Blauer’s head and a slight tremor in
his right leg.196 The study records made prior to the second injection indicate that Blauer
again was “apprehensive,” although this time there was little or no physical reaction to
the chemical.197 Prior to his third injection, the nurses observed that Blauer was more
disturbed about his continued participation in the research.198 Blauer reportedly asked
one of the nurses if she would call the physicians in charge of the study and tell them that
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he had a cold, because the doctors would not believe Blauer if he told them.199
Notwithstanding this request, Blauer received his third injection, which caused him to
shake all over.200 Prior to his fourth injection, Blauer stated that he did not want to
receive any more injections.201 In response, Blauer was told that if he did not continue
his research participation, he would have to leave the Psychiatric Institute and return to
Bellevue or Roosevelt Hospital, where he had been admitted and unhappy prior to his
admission to the Psychiatric Institute.202 Blauer reportedly did not pursue his complaints
any further. 203 The fourth injection caused Blauer to suffer a violent reaction, including
body tremors and repeated sitting up and flopping back down.204
¶ 52
For his fifth injection, Blauer was to receive 450 milligrams, or sixteen times the
amount, of the derivative he had received in his first injection.205 Before this injection,
Blauer again complained to his therapist and the nurses about the injections.206
Notwithstanding, Blauer received the injection sometime between 9:53 and 9:57 a.m. on
January 8, 1953, after which he became restless and started sweating profusely and
flailing his arms.207 Then, his body stiffened, his teeth clenched, and he began frothing at
the mouth.208 Finally, he fell into a deep coma.209 Harold Blauer was pronounced dead
at 12:15 p.m.210 Shortly thereafter, the Psychiatric Institute informed the New York City
Medical Examiner of Blauer’s death, stating in its written report that Blauer’s injections
were for diagnostic purposes, not research:

The patient received an intravenous injection of a mescaline derivative at
9:53 a.m. on January 8, 1953 for diagnostic purposes. He had received
this drug previously with no untoward reaction. A few minutes after the
injection the patient became unconscious, showed a tonic rigidity of neck
and arms and legs, became cyanotic, pulse became thready and blood
pressure dropped to 110/40. He was given intravenous glucose and
coramine and nasal oxygen and he showed a marked improvement. He
started to speak and appeared to be on the way to recovery. Then he
suddenly became pulseless, blood pressure dropped, respiration ceased
and he expired. He was pronounced dead at 12:15 p.m.211
Although the experiment was conducted in late 1952 and early 1953, it was not
until 1975 that it was publicly disclosed that the Army had supplied the chemicals Blauer
received and that the injections were part of an experiment to develop chemical warfare
¶ 53
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agents.212 In the meantime, Blauer’s survivors, on behalf of his estate, brought several
actions against the State of New York and the Psychiatric Institute, resulting in several
judicial opinions that contain significant detail about the experiment, including copies of
study records documenting Blauer’s reactions to all five injections.213 As explained by
federal District Court Judge Constance Baker Motley in a judicial opinion authored in
1987, the Army and the Psychiatric Institute treated Blauer like a guinea pig:
The case arises from the death of Harold Blauer, a mental patient who died
in 1953 as a guinea pig in an experiment to test potential chemical warfare
agents for the United States Army. Rather than admit its role in Blauer's
death, the Government covered up its involvement in the affair, thus this
opinion is issued today rather than in the early 1950’s when the death
occurred.214
The judge’s reference to guinea pigs was, perhaps, an allusion to Englishman M. H.
Pappworth’s book Human Guinea Pigs, which exposed numerous experiments in which
vulnerable human subjects, including individuals with mental disabilities who could not
consent to their own research participation, were enrolled in nontherapeutic research.215
¶ 54
I selected the Blauer case for review because it illustrates several legal and
ethical concerns relating to the reasonableness of research risks in relation to expected
benefits, the use of captive, vulnerable populations for medical experimentation, and the
lack of informed consent (or continued consent) to research participation. First, the
Blauer case contains obvious issues relating to the reasonableness of the risks posed to
Blauer and the other subjects by the mescaline injections in relationship to the anticipated
benefits. According to the Army’s own research proposal, the anticipated benefits
included “new technical data . . . [that] will provide a firmer basis for the utilization of
psychochemical agents both for offensive use as sabotage weapons and for protection
against them.”216 The anticipated benefits did not include therapeutic benefits to Blauer
or to the other research subjects.217 The question thus becomes whether the risks posed
by the chemicals were reasonable in relationship to the importance of the expected
chemical warfare data. In hindsight, the question certainly would be answered in the
negative. The death of a subject certainly outweighs any potential benefit to be derived
from new chemical warfare knowledge. The question is supposed to be answered
prospectively, however. Although the scientists probably did not know, at least
definitely, that Blauer or another subject would die, they were aware, as a result of prior
toxicity testing involving mice, that death (at least to mice) was a possibility.218 They
also knew (or at least one court found that they knew) that the scientists had not yet
conducted additional toxicity testing sufficient to determine the chemical’s safety in
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humans.219 Many believe that the risks posed to Blauer and to the other research
subjects, even viewed prospectively, were not reasonable in relationship to the
knowledge that was expected to result.
¶ 55
With respect to concerns relating to captivity and vulnerability, it is important to
note that Blauer was an inpatient at a psychiatric hospital. Although he was a voluntary
patient, which means he technically could have left the Psychiatric Institute against
medical advice at any time, he appears to have wanted to stay and receive treatment until
his condition resolved to the point where he could resume normal daily activities at work
and home. This is supported by evidence that Blauer was unhappy and had left two
previous psychiatric facilities, Bellevue and Roosevelt Hospital, and that Blauer was
staying and making substantial progress at the Psychiatric Institute and had agreed,
together with his therapist, to a release date a few weeks later, in early 1953.220
¶ 56
Note, however, that when Blauer stated prior to his fourth injection that he no
longer wanted to receive the injections, he was told that if he did not continue the
injections, he would be forced to leave the Psychiatric Institute and return to Bellevue or
Roosevelt Hospital.221 This statement supports Blauer’s constructive captivity. Stated
another way, although Blauer technically could have left the Psychiatric Institute at any
time, it used Blauer’s desire to receive further treatment to coerce him into participating
in its research project. We also might say that Blauer’s attempt to withdraw from
research participation involved a penalty, which would be the loss of access to continued
treatment at the Psychiatric Institute. As will be reviewed in Part II(D), federal law now
requires scientists to allow research subjects to withdraw their research participation at
any time without any penalties or the loss of any benefits to which they may be otherwise
entitled.222
¶ 57
In addition to concerns relating to captive, vulnerable populations, the Blauer
case raises potential competency issues and serious informed consent issues. Some
patients with severe mental illness, such as untreated schizophrenia, may not be
competent to consent to their own research participation because they may not be able to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to participate in
research.223 Clinicians must make an individualized determination regarding whether a
particular patient does or does not have decision-making capacity.224 In Blauer’s case, he
did have an initial diagnosis of severe depression and/or pseudo-neurotic schizophrenia;
219
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45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2007) (Federal Common Rule provision requiring potential research subjects
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See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Decisional Capacity of Patients with Schizophrenia to Consent to
Research: Taking Stock, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN 22, 22 (2006) (explaining that patients with
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however, he was scheduled to be released within a few weeks “without any disability,”
and it was expected that he would return to teaching tennis and parenting his children.225
Even by today’s standards, Blauer probably would be considered competent to give
consent to his own research participation because he had the ability to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own research participation and to reach an
informed decision regarding the matter.226 Blauer was not, however, informed of the true
nature of the experiment to which he was asked to consent.227 Remember, Blauer was
unaware that his injections were being administered to help the Army’s chemical warfare
efforts and that the injections were not for his own benefit.228 Blauer thus was competent
to give his consent, but any consent that he did give was not informed and would not be
considered valid by today’s standards.229
C. Hepatitis Experimentation at Willowbrook Hospital
The Army’s chemical warfare research project certainly was not the last
experiment that involved patients with mental disorders. In 1967, British physician H.
M. Pappworth wrote about a number of questionable research studies, including one
experiment that investigated blood flow in the brains of over one hundred elderly patients
with dementia.230 During this experiment, scientists inserted long needles into each
patient’s jugular veins and femoral artery while the patient inhaled radioactive gas. 231
The publication of these and other study results in prestigious science journals such as
British Medical Journal and Journal of Clinical Investigation suggests both the
commonality and the acceptance of experiments involving patients with mental disorders
in the mid-1900s.232
¶ 58

¶ 59
Even these experiments, however, are said to pale in comparison with the
questionable research activities that occurred at the Willowbrook State School
(Willowbrook) on Staten Island in New York in the mid-1960s.233 During this study, Dr.
Saul Krugman and a group of infectious-disease physicians from New York University
decided to use students at Willowbrook to study the natural history of hepatitis and
225
Barrett, 660 F. Supp. at 1317 (“If he had not died, he would have been released soon from the
Psychiatric Institute, without any disability that would have prevented him from working.”).
226
Id. at 1299 (“Blauer was competent to give consent to the experiment.”). Competence, sometimes
referred to as decision-making capacity, may be defined as the ability to understand and appreciate the
nature and consequences of a decision regarding medical treatment or research participation and the ability
to reach an informed decision in the matter. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 313.002(3)
(2007) (defining competence in the treatment context).
227
Barrett, 660 F. Supp. at 1299.
228
Id. at 1299.
229
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3) (2007) (requiring informed consent documentation to describe to the
potential subject “any benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably be expected from the
research.”). For Blauer’s consent to be informed, Blauer would have had to be told that he personally
would not benefit from the research, that any benefits would go directly to the Army Chemical Corps, and
that the corps’ goal was to gain knowledge regarding the effects of mescaline derivatives in support of their
chemical warfare efforts.
230
MORENO, supra note 160, at 136-37.
231
Id. at 137.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 139.
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develop possible treatments.234 The students at Willowbrook had severe mental
retardation,235 a condition we would now call severe intellectual or developmental
disability,236 and reportedly, many of the students acquired hepatitis following admission
due to repeated exposure to each others’ body fluids. 237
¶ 60
During his study, Krugman intentionally infected Willowbrook students with the
live hepatitis B virus.238 Krugman justified his experiment by what he referred to as the
inevitableness of hepatitis in the student body (according to Krugman, most of the
Willowbrook students acquired hepatitis within the first six to twelve months of their
admission239), the reported mildness of the disease symptoms in this particular schoolaged population, and his belief that the students’ research participation actually benefited
them because mild hepatitis infection provides protection against future, and more severe,
hepatitis infections.240 Krugman reportedly obtained approval to proceed with his study
from two New York State agencies: the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board and the
human-experimentation committees of the New York University School of Medicine and
the Willowbrook School.241
¶ 61
The Willowbrook students were incompetent to consent to their own research
participation because many were less than eighteen years old and had severe intellectual
and developmental disabilities, the latter of which made it impossible for even the older
students to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to
participate in research.242 Krugman thus obtained consent to the students’ research
participation from their parents.243 In many cases, the consent was coerced.244 For
example, some of the children had yet to be admitted to Willowbrook.245 Krugman
encouraged the parents of these children to consent to their children’s research
participation by arranging for more rapid admission to the school.246 Other parents,
whose children already were admitted, were told that Willowbrook was closing due to
234

Id.; RONALD MUNSON, INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 240 (1979).
See MORENO, supra note 160, at 139; MUNSON, supra note 234, at 240.
236
See, e.g., Anna Prabhala, Mental Retardation Is No More—New Name Is Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities, AAIDD NEWS, Feb. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.aamr.org/About_AAIDD/MR_name_change.htm (last visited July 26, 2007) (discussing
society’s struggle to find a socially acceptable way of addressing and referring to individuals with
intellectual disabilities).
237
See MORENO, supra note 160, at 139; MUNSON, supra note 234, at 241.
238
See MORENO, supra note 160, at 139; MUNSON, supra note 234, at 241.
239
See MUNSON, supra note 234, at 240.
240
Saul Krugman, Letter to the Editor of Lancet, republished in INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC
ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 281, 281-82 (Ronald Munson ed., 1979) (“As early as 1960 we demonstrated
the protective effect of this vaccine during the course of an epidemic. . . . It is well known that viral
hepatitis in children is milder and more benign than the same disease in adults. . . . The statement by Dr.
Goldby accusing us of conducting experiments exclusively for the acquisition of knowledge with no benefit
for the children cannot be supported by the true facts.”). See also MORENO, supra note 160, at 139;
MUNSON, supra note 234, at 241.
241
MUNSON, supra note 234, at 241-42.
242
See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 223, at 22.
243
See MORENO, supra note 160, at 139; MUNSON, supra note 234, at 241.
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See MORENO, supra note 160, at 139; MUNSON, supra note 234, at 241.
245
See MORENO, supra note 160, at 139.
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overcrowding; however, a week or two later, the same parents were told that there would
be room (and vaccines) in the “hepatitis unit” for children whose parents consented to the
experiment.247
¶ 62
Like the Army’s chemical warfare research, the Willowbrook study raises
concerns relating to the reasonableness of the research risks in relation to the expected
benefits; the use of a captive, vulnerable population for medical experimentation; and
coerced, third-party consent to research participation.248
With respect to the
reasonableness of the risks in relationship to the expected benefits, Krugman argued that
the mild hepatitis infections benefited the students by protecting them against future,
more severe strains of hepatitis.249 Others believe that the intentional infection of
students with hepatitis can in no way be classified as directly therapeutic, or a benefit, to
the students and that it must be classified as a research harm because hepatitis B causes
lifelong infection, cirrhosis (scarring) of the liver, liver cancer, liver failure, and death.250
The question thus becomes whether the harms associated with intentional hepatitis
infection were reasonable in relationship to the knowledge that was expected to result.
Most (other than Krugman) believe that the Willowbrook experiment was unreasonable
because it offered no direct benefit to the students and directly caused the students’
hepatitis infection, even though knowledge regarding the natural course of hepatitis and
its treatment was expected to, and did in fact, result.251

With respect to concerns relating to captivity and vulnerability, the subjects
were institutionalized at a school for individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities. Although the students probably could have left the school with their parents’
permission and agreement to care for them, some of the parents were told that their
children would lose their current admissions if they did not volunteer their children for
the study.252 Other parents were told that their children could be admitted to the school if
they volunteered their children for the study.253 These facts support the children’s
constructive captivity. Stated another way, although the children technically could have
left Willowbrook with their parents’ permission, Krugman used the parents’ desire to
obtain or maintain institutional placement for their children to coerce (some say
blackmail) the parents into volunteering their children for research.254
¶ 63

¶ 64
In addition to concerns relating to captive, vulnerable populations, the
Willowbrook case raises very real competency and informed consent issues. Again,
247

M. H. Pappworth, Letter to the Editor of Lancet, republished in INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC
ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 282, 282 (Ronald Munson ed., 1979).
248
MUNSON, supra note 234 at 242.
249
Krugman, supra note 240; MORENO, supra note 160 at 139; MUNSON, supra note 234 at 241.
250
See, e.g., Stephen Goldby, Letter to the Editor of Lancet, republished in INTERVENTION AND
REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS, 280, 280 (Ronald Munson ed., 1979).
251
Id. at 280 (“If Krugman and Giles are keen to continue their experiments I suggest that they invite the
parents of the children involved to participate. I wonder what the response would be.”). Others believe
that Krugman’s research significantly furthered knowledge of the natural course of viral hepatitis and its
methods of treatment. MUNSON, supra note 234, at 242.
252
Pappworth, supra note 247, at 282.
253
MORENO, supra note 160, at 139.
254
See MUNSON, supra note 234, at 242.
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some patients with mild developmental disabilities, such as attention deficit disorder,
certainly are competent to consent to their own research participation. The minor
students at Willowbrook, however, had severe intellectual disabilities that prohibited
them from understanding and appreciating the nature and consequences of their own
research participation. As a result, the scientists obtained consent from their parents. I
already have discussed whether this consent was coerced. A second question, equally
important, is whether the consent was informed. For example, were the parents told that
intentional infection with hepatitis causes lifelong infection, cirrhosis (scarring) of the
liver, liver cancer, liver failure, and death?255 If not, the parents’ consent would not be
considered valid by today’s standards.256
D. The Development of Federal Protections
¶ 65
The Army’s chemical warfare research and the Willowbrook study certainly
were not the only questionable experiments involving patients with psychiatric conditions
and developmental disabilities that led to the development of human-subjects protections.
Dozens of other studies, including LSD research conducted on psychiatric patients in the
1960s257 (and, more recently, drug-free, or “washout,” studies in which scientists take
patients who have schizophrenia off their medications to establish their baseline behavior
prior to administering new medications, resulting in suicide in some cases),258 called (and
continue to call) attention to the need for, and the enforcement of, ethical and legal
principles governing human subjects research.
¶ 66
The development of ethical and legal protections for human subjects has been
thoroughly researched and documented elsewhere.259 In this section, I provide a much
abbreviated history of the development of relevant American ethical and legal humansubjects protections with a focus on the attempted development of protections for
research subjects with decisional impairments. As you read this section, pay attention to
the guidance provided by each ethical and legal authority regarding balancing research
risks and benefits, especially in emerging disciplines, as well as who, if anyone, can
consent to research participation on behalf of an individual with a decisional
impairment.260
¶ 67
The first modern code mandating protection of human subjects was, ironically,
adopted in Germany prior to the Third Reich.261 The “Reich Circular of 1931,” which
built on a 1900 directive from the Prussian minister for religious, educational, and

255

Goldby, supra note 250, at 280.
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2007) (requiring informed consent documentation to describe to the
potential subject “any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts”).
257
MORENO, supra note 160, at 154-55.
258
See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Drug-Free Research in Schizophrenia: An Overview of the Controversy,
18 IRB: ETHICS AND HUMAN RESEARCH 1-5 (1996) (examining the sudden interest in the ethics of
psychiatric research); MORENO, supra note 160, at 137 (referencing drug-free schizophrenia research).
259
See supra note 160.
260
See LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, WHO DECIDES? MAKING DECISIONS ON BEHALF OF MENTALLY
INCAPACITATED ADULTS 1 (London: Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1997).
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EATON & KENNEDY, supra note 160, at 37; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 160, at 153-54.
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medical affairs, established fourteen provisions, including provisions that required
scientists conducting human-subjects research to establish a careful research design, to
give to potential subjects appropriate information about the research project, to obtain
consent prior to research, and to provide special protections for vulnerable subjects.262
The Reich Circular required consent, whether first-party or proxy, to be given “in a clear
and undebatable manner.”263 Given its requirement for special protections and its
reference to proxy consent, the Reich Circular thus expressly considered that some
research projects might involve vulnerable or incompetent subjects.
The story of United States v. Brandt (the “Nazi Doctors’ Trial”)264 and the
resulting Nuremberg Code265 is, by now, well known. The Nazi Doctors’ Trial was the
first of twelve trials for war crimes that U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone in
Nuremberg, Germany, following World War II.266 Twenty of the twenty-three
defendants (physicians who were accused of murder, torture, and other atrocities) had
been involved in human experiments designed to contribute to knowledge regarding the
survival of German pilots and soldiers.267 The physicians had recruited human subjects
from the Dachau prison camp and exposed them to low air pressures, lack of oxygen, icecold tubs of water, subfreezing temperatures, gunshot wounds, burns, amputations, and
chemical and biological agents.268 By the end of the Nazi Doctors’ Trial in 1947, seven
of the twenty-three defendants were acquitted, seven received death sentences, and the
remainder received prison sentences ranging from ten years to life imprisonment.269
¶ 68

¶ 69
The chief medical advisor to the Nuremberg judges, Dr. Leo Alexander, wrote a
memorandum to the trial judges, one part of which included standards for the ethical
conduct of human subjects research.270 (In his memorandum, Dr. Alexander had
identified individuals with mental illness as a population that should receive special
protection; however, the judges declined to incorporate these special protections in their
final opinion.271) The standards that the judges included in their opinion became known
as the Nuremberg Code.272 Although the code contains several ethical requirements
relating to yielding fruitful results, basing human experimentation on prior animal
experimentation, avoiding all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury, and
having no expectation of death or disabling injury,273 the code perhaps is most well
known for its first line: “The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential.”274 This requirement, which by its terms refers to the human subject,
262

EATON & KENNEDY, supra note 160, at 37-38.
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 160, at 154.
264
See ANNAS & GRODIN, supra note 160 (devoting themselves to the Nazi Doctors Trial, the Nuremberg
Code, and the application of Nuremberg Code principles to current research projects).
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The Nuremberg Code, reprinted in VANDERPOOL, supra note 160, at 431-32.
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DUNN & CHADWICK, supra note 160, at 14-16.
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Id. at 15-16.
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Id. at 15.
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Id. at 16.
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immediately questions the propriety of research involving individuals who cannot
consent to their own research participation.275 The first line of the code is followed by
some explanatory language:
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent, should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion, and
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and
enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the
experiment; the methods and means by which it is to be conducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation
in the experiment.276
¶ 70
The meaning of this explanatory language continues to be debated. Some
commentators believe that the “legal capacity” requirement prohibits individuals with
decisional impairments and children from taking part in research; others believe that the
requirement forbids only individuals with decisional impairments and children from
signing the consent form.277 Some commentators believe that the “so situated” clause
refers to captive individuals, such as individuals in prisons and mental institutions, who
may be coerced into consenting to research by reason of their captivity.278 Moreover,
some commentators believe that the “knowledge and comprehension” and “enlightened
decision” references prohibit individuals with decisional impairments from participating
in research.279 Finally, although the Nuremberg Code does not so state, many believe
that the entire first paragraph, which establishes the basic principle of informed consent,
comes into play only following a positive assessment of research benefits and risks.280
¶ 71
With respect to balancing research risks and benefits, the Nuremberg Code
contains two relevant statements: “The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful
results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not
275

COLEMAN, supra note 160, at 585 (“A literal application of this provision would preclude any research
with individuals who lack the mental capacity to provide informed consent—for example comatose
patients. . . .”).
276
The Nuremberg Code, reprinted in VANDERPOOL, supra note 160, at 431.
277
ADIL E. SHAMOO & FELIX A. KHIN-MAUNG-GYI, ETHICS OF THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH
76 (2002). See generally CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH
HUMAN SUBJECTS 585 (2005) (explaining that the “legal capacity” requirement could be interpreted to
preclude any research with individuals who lack decision-making capacity but that such a policy would
make it difficult to develop treatments for individuals affected with these conditions; further noting that the
amount of research involving adults who lack decision-making capacity is growing exponentially, thus
suggesting that the scientists who conduct this research do not interpret the “legal capacity” requirement to
preclude such research).
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SHAMOO & KHIN-MAUNG-GYI, supra note 277, at 76.
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Id.
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random and unnecessary in nature,”281 and “[t]he degree of risk to be taken should never
exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by
the experiment.”282 Taken together, these statements suggest that nontherapeutic research
(i.e., research that does not directly or potentially benefit individual subjects) is
permissible so long as it contributes to nonrandom generalizable knowledge and is not
risky. (In contrast, the new Atomic Energy Commission in a meeting held the same year
unsuccessfully attempted to impose a requirement of potential benefit for the subject.)283
¶ 72
The distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research became even
more important in the 1960s, although the distinction was relevant only to the
requirement of consent, not the permissibility of the conduct of the research. In 1964,
during its Eighteenth Assembly in Helsinki, Finland, the World Medical Association
adopted a code (the Declaration of Helsinki) that distinguished therapeutic research,
defined as research combined with patient care, from nontherapeutic research, defined as
“purely scientific research that has no therapeutic value or purpose for the specific
subjects studied.”284 The declaration did not require informed consent for therapeutic
research if consent was not “consistent with patient psychology.”285 The declaration did
require consent for nontherapeutic research except when mental incapacity made it
impossible to obtain informed consent (in which case permission from the responsible
relative would replace the subject’s consent if allowed under applicable national law).286

With the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki firmly in place, the
U.S. government increased its protective efforts in the 1970s.287 In 1971, the federal
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) established guidelines for the
protection of federally funded human research subjects, including a requirement for prior
IRB approval of research protocols.288 Among other things, IRBs now had the
responsibility of balancing the risks posed to subjects by particular research protocols
against the combination of the benefits to the subjects and the importance of the
¶ 73
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The Nuremberg Code, reprinted in VANDERPOOL, supra note 160, at 431.
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See MORENO, supra note 160, at 116. The question of whether direct or potential research subject
benefit is required, as well as the meaning of such benefit, will become important when I discuss in Part
III(A) the knowledge and benefits that may result from neuroimaging research into disorders of
consciousness.
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World Medical Assembly, Declaration of Helsinki, in VANDERPOOL, supra note 160, at 433-35 (“In the
field of biomedical research, a fundamental distinction must be recognized between medical research in
which the aim is essentially diagnostic or therapeutic for a patient, and medical research, the essential
object of which is purely scientific and without implying direct diagnostic or therapeutic value to the
person subjected to the research.”). See also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 160, at 156.
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World Medical Assembly, Declaration of Helsinki, in VANDERPOOL, supra note 160, at 435. See also
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 160, at 156.
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World Medical Assembly, Declaration of Helsinki, in VANDERPOOL, supra note 160, at 435. See also
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 160, at 156. The provision allowing permission from a responsible
relative would not apply in countries, such as the United Kingdom, where the law, with some exceptions,
does not recognize proxy consent. MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE ETHICAL CONDUCT OF RESEARCH
ON THE MENTALLY INCAPACITATED 9 (London: Medical Research Council 1993).
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knowledge to be gained.289 Only if the benefits outweighed the risks could the IRB
approve the study and allow subjects to be offered research participation.290
In 1974, Congress passed the National Research Act, which created the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (the “Commission”).291 The Commission was charged with recommending the
basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of human-subjects research and
developing guidelines to assure that human-subjects research complied with these
principles.292 In February 1978, near the end of its tenure, the Commission issued a
special report (the “Commission Special Report”) making recommendations for humansubjects research involving individuals “institutionalized as mentally infirm,” which
included “individuals with mental illness, mental retardation, emotional disturbances,
psychoses, senility, and other impairments of a similar nature who reside in an
institution.”293 The Commission recommended that research participation not interfere
with the care of such individuals and that research projects be relevant to the condition of
any subjects who cannot consent to their own research participation.294 Although HEW
proposed regulations based on the recommendations set forth in the Commission Special
Report in November 1978,295 the agency did not adopt them in final form then or
thereafter in 1981 or 1983, when the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research further recommended
their adoption.296
¶ 74

¶ 75
At the very end of its tenure (in late 1978), the Commission completed its bynow-famous Belmont Report, which established three basic ethical principles (respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice) and examined their application to requirements relating
to informed consent, the assessment of research risks and benefits, and the selection of
289

Id.
Id.
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Id. National Research Act Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, §§ 201-202, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 289l-1 (1974).
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National Research Act, §§ 201-202. See EATON & KENNEDY, supra note 160, at 42 (discussing the
National Research Act).
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NAT’L COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE INSTITUTIONALIZED AS MENTALLY INFIRM xvii (defining
“institutionalized mentally infirm”) and cover letter from Kenneth J. Ryan to Walter F. Mondale, Feb. 2,
1978 (identifying the Commission’s recommendations), DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 78-0006 (1978), published
at 43 Fed. Reg. 11328 (Mar. 17, 1978) [hereinafter, Commission Special Report]. Although individuals
with DOC are not specifically listed in the definition of “individuals institutionalized mentally infirm,” an
analogy may be made to the psychiatric and developmental disability conditions listed, especially to the
extent individuals with these conditions reside in nursing homes and similar institutions. See id. at xviii
(listing “nursing homes for the mentally disabled, and similar institutions” as qualifying institutions).
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Commission Special Report, supra note 293 (cover letter from Kenneth J. Ryan to Walter F. Mondale,
Feb. 2, 1978). More specific recommendations relating to minimal-risk and more-than-minimal-risk
research are set forth in the body of the Commission Special Report. Id. at 1-22. See generally MORENO,
supra note 160, at 164 (discussing the history of the Commission Special Report).
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(1996).
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research subjects.297 HEW formally published the Belmont Report in the Federal
Register on April 18, 1979.298 With respect to the involvement of individuals with
decisional impairments in human-subjects research, the Belmont Report recognized that
(1) special provisions may need to be made for these individuals, (2) the principle of
respect for persons requires consent to research participation to come from a third party
who is most likely to understand the individual’s situation and to act in the individual’s
best interest, and (3) the third party should have the opportunity to observe the research
as it proceeds and withdraw the individual from the research if withdrawal is in the
individual’s best interest.299
¶ 76
In 1981, the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which
was the successor to HEW, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued
regulations based on the Belmont Report.300 Ten years later, more than a dozen federal
agencies adopted the core of the HHS regulations, which are now referred to as the
Common Rule.301 Today, the Common Rule is shared by seventeen federal departments
and agencies302 and regulates U.S. federally funded research, research conducted at an
institution that has obligated itself through a multiple project assurance to comply with
the Common Rule with respect to all of its research, and research conducted in
contemplation of a submission to the FDA.303
¶ 77
As amended over the years, the Common Rule contains special subparts for
several vulnerable populations, including fetuses, pregnant women, and human in vitro
fertilization,304 as well as prisoners305 and children.306 The Common Rule also requires
IRBs to ensure vulnerable research groups, including “mentally disabled persons,”
receive additional safeguards designed to protect their health and welfare.307 Finally, the
297
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Common Rule requires IRBs to consider the inclusion of one or more individuals who are
knowledgeable about and experienced in working with individuals who are members of
these vulnerable populations if the IRB regularly reviews research involving such
populations.308
¶ 78
The Common Rule does not, however, contain a special subpart governing
human-subjects research involving adults who have decisional impairments due to a
severe psychiatric condition, intellectual or developmental disability, disorder of
consciousness, or other mental or neurological disorder.309 Why a special subpart was
not included continues to be debated. HEW, through its secretary, suggested that the
rules it proposed in 1978 “had produced a ‘lack of consensus’” and that the core of the
Common Rule “adequately . . . protect[ed]” individuals with decisional impairments.310
Former Commission member Al Jonsen reported concern by others that the
Commission’s recommendations would stifle research into mental conditions
accompanied by decisional impairments.311 Harvard Professor Neil Chayet shared these
concerns and stated that “the legal and medical perspectives on the subject are
fundamentally incompatible—particularly in the area of the mentally disabled, where
appreciation of the concept of informed consent is well on its way to paralyzing research
and treatment.”312
¶ 79
Without a special subpart to guide their efforts, scientists who design (and IRBs
that review) research projects involving adults with decisional impairments must ensure
that each project complies with the generic criteria set forth in the core of the Common
Rule.313 Among other things, these core criteria require the following: (1) the risks to
subjects to be minimized; (2) the risks to subjects to be “reasonable in relation to
anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may
reasonably be expected to result”; (3) informed consent to be “sought from each
prospective subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative”; and (4) “when
some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence,”
including individuals with mental disorders, additional safeguards to be included to
protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.314
¶ 80
The multi-agency adoption of the Common Rule in 1991 did not end the federal
government’s struggle with how best to protect human research subjects. The Clinton
Administration in 1995 formed the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC)
and charged it with studying important issues in bioethics, including human-subjects

consent processes to ensure voluntariness. It is not known how frequently IRBs implement these and other
safeguards. See generally MORENO, supra note 160, at 165.
308
45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (2007).
309
See MORENO, supra note 160, at 165.
310
Levine, supra note 296, at 1.
311
See generally MORENO, supra note 160, at 164.
312
Neil L. Chayet, Informed Consent of the Mentally Disabled: A Failing Fiction, 6 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS
82, 82 (1976); MORENO, supra note 160, at 165 (quoting Chayet).
313
45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2007).
314
Id.
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research.315 Over the next two years, the NBAC held hearings on several issues,
including research participation by individuals with decisional impairments.316 In
December 1998, NBAC issued a special report (the “NBAC Report”) addressing research
involving individuals whose mental disorders may affect their decision-making
capacity.317 NBAC acknowledged the tension between the rapid advances in science and
technology, especially in the area of the diagnosis and treatment of individuals with
mental disorders, and the rather staid core provisions of the Common Rule:
During the nearly two decades in which the current federal regulations for
the protection of human subjects have been in place, important scientific
research on the cause and treatment of mental disorders has continued and
expanded. . . . NBAC shares what it believes to be a broad base of support
for continuing efforts to more fully understand and treat mental disorders.
NBAC recommends additional new protections with the deepest respect
for the many people involved in research on these disorders: those with a
disorder that may affect decisionmaking capacity.318
With this lead in, it was not surprising that the NBAC found that “a cogent case
could be made” for the establishment of a new subpart in the Common Rule that would
govern human-subjects research involving adults with decisional impairments.319 The
NBAC also recommended that IRBs be permitted to approve a research study that
presents only minimal risk (as are many fMRI investigations into DOC) so long as the
subject consents or, if the subject cannot consent due to lack of decision-making capacity,
the subject’s legally authorized representative (LAR) consents.320 The NBAC also
recognized that years, if not decades, could pass before a federal agency would adopt
final regulations implementing their recommendations and therefore suggested that
scientists, academic medical centers, and IRBs voluntarily adopt and comply with the
¶ 81

315

Clinton Executive Order 12975, Protection of Human Research Subjects and Creation of National
Bioethics Advisory Commission, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,036 (Oct. 5, 1995) (mandating the review of current
human subjects regulations). See generally EATON & KENNEDY, supra note 160, at 44.
316
See generally SHAMOO & KHIN-MAUNG-GYI, supra note 277, at 79 (discussing the work of the NBAC).
317
NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL
DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY (1998),
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/TOC.htm (last visited August 2, 2007) [hereinafter, NBAC
REPORT].
318
Id. at Executive Summary, available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/Executive.htm
(last visited Aug. 2, 2007).
319
Id. (“NBAC believes that a cogent case can be made for requiring additional special protections in
research involving as subjects persons with impaired decision making capacity, but has chosen to focus this
report on persons with mental disorders, in part because of this population’s difficult history of
involvement in medical research.”); id. at Summary and Recommendations, available at
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/Moving.htm#NewRegs (last visited Aug. 2, 2007) (“Many
of the regulatory proposals made by NBAC could, however, also be accomplished by the creation of a new
subpart in 45 CFR 46. Adoption of a subpart has the advantage of permitting affected federal agencies to
act as expeditiously as they choose to change the regulatory requirements for their own intramural and
extramural research.”). See generally SHAMOO & KHIN-MAUNG-GYI, supra note 277, at 79 (examining the
NBAC Report).
320
NBAC REPORT, supra note 317, at Recommendations 10 and 14, available at
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/Moving.htm#NewRegs (last visited Aug. 2, 2007).
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substance of the NBAC Report.321
¶ 82
As of today, neither HHS nor any other signatory to the Common Rule has
adopted in federal regulations the NBAC’s recommendations.322 The absence of federal
law governing research involving adults with decisional impairments does not mean,
however, that scientists are not conducting research projects involving these populations;
in fact, the number of projects has recently increased.323 Without any specific federal
guidance,324 scientists, IRBs, federal agencies, lawyers, ethicists, and advocacy groups
are left to draw their own opinions regarding the following: the appropriateness of
enrolling individuals with decisional impairments, including DOC, into research studies;
the class of risk to which various types of neuroimaging should be assigned; how to
balance research risks and benefits; and who constitutes a LAR permitted to consent to
the individual’s research participation.325

E. The Development of State Protections
Perhaps due to the lack of express federal guidance, some state legislatures, state
courts, and state agencies have attempted to more specifically address—via legislation,
regulation, judicial opinions, and attorney general guidance—the rights of human
subjects with decisional impairments.326 New York, for example, adopted a “Protection
of Human Subjects” statute designed to “protect its people against the unnecessary and
improper risk of pain, suffering or injury resulting from human research conducted
without their knowledge or consent.”327 The New York statute requires a humanresearch review committee to determine that the risks to human subjects are outweighed
by the potential benefits or by the importance of the knowledge to be gained.328 In the
case of human subjects who do not have decision-making capacity, the statute expressly
permits another person who is legally empowered to act on the subject’s behalf to consent
¶ 83

321

See SHAMOO & KHIN-MAUNG-GYI, supra note 277, at 79.
Id.
323
COLEMAN, supra note 160, at 585.
324
Id.
325
See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Mentally Disabled Research Subjects: The Enduring Policy Issues, 276
JAMA 67, 72 (1996) (“In the meantime, it will be up to investigators and IRBs to maintain the precarious
balance between the interests of mentally disabled subjects and the public’s desire for medical progress.”);
J. de Champlain & J. Patenaude, Review of a Mock Research Protocol in Functional Neuroimaging by
Canadian Research Ethics Boards, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 530, 533 (2006) (“The risk-benefit component is the
most difficult for [research ethics boards] to assess, more so when the study relates to an emerging
discipline. REBs have little guidance to turn to in risk-benefit assessment. That they are thus effectively
left to find their own way may partly account for the variability of decisions in our study.”).
326
See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann & Jack Schwartz, Proxy Consent to Participation of the Decisionally
Impaired in Medical Research—Maryland’s Policy Initiative, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 123, 125
(1998) (“Because federal law leaves unanswered the question of who is a ‘legally authorized
representative’ for consent to research, researchers who seek to rely on this provision of federal law must
turn to relevant state law for guidance. Unfortunately, little, if any, state law directly addresses this
issue.”).
327
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. § 2440 (2007).
328
Id. § 2444(2).
322

Vol. 13

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

No. 2

2008

Tovino, Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of Consciousness

41

to the subject’s research participation.329
¶ 84
New York is not the only state to have considered research involving individuals
with decisional impairments. The Maryland Legislature found that “[r]esearch involving
decisionally incapacitated individuals may be essential under some circumstances if
science is to understand and ultimately combat diseases of the brain, including . . . severe
trauma” and that “[r]esearchers should seek to enroll decisionally incapacitated
individuals as research subjects only if the research is likely to yield generalizable
knowledge important to the understanding or amelioration of the subjects’ disorder or
condition, and the knowledge cannot be obtained without their participation.”330
California also has a relevant statute that allows for consent to research participation by a
conservator but only “for medical experiments related to maintaining or improving the
health of the human subject or related to obtaining information about a pathological
condition of the human subject.”331 A number of other states have statutes that require
court approval before a guardian or conservator may consent to the research participation
of an individual with decisional impairment if the court can determine that the
experimental treatment will be in the individual’s best interests.332 In states that do not
address consent to research participation, some scientists rely on consent-to-treatment
statutes or durable power of attorney for healthcare statutes to find a proxy.333
¶ 85
In addition to state statutes and regulations, state courts and attorneys general
weigh in on ethical and legal questions relating to human-subjects research. In T.D. v.
New York State, for example, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
reviewed a challenge to state regulations governing more-than-minimal-risk
nontherapeutic and possibly therapeutic experiments.334 The court found that the
regulations did not adequately safeguard the health and welfare of human research
subjects and violated both the federal and the New York due process clauses.335
Likewise, the Maryland Attorney General issued a report on Alzheimer’s disease care
and part of the report addressed the applicability of Maryland’s surrogate consent to
treatment statute to the research setting. The attorney general concluded that healthcare
agents and surrogates may consent to an individual’s research participation if, and only if,
the research “presents a reasonable prospect of direct medical benefit,” reasoning that the
statute was designed to regulate only healthcare, not experimental studies designed only

329

Id. § 2442 (“If the human subject be otherwise legally unable to render consent, such consent shall
be subscribed to in writing by such other person as may be legally empowered to act on behalf of the
human subject.”).
330
Draft, An Act Concerning Research—Protection of Decisionally Incapacitated Individuals, Appendix A,
May 5, 1997, Part I, § 20-501(c)-(d) (on file with author).
331
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24175(e) (2007).
332
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STATE ANN. 45a-677(e) (West Supp. 2007) (requiring proof that the experiment is
intended to preserve the life or prevent serious impairment of the physical health of the ward or it is
intended to assist the ward to regain his abilities and has been approved for that person by the court); 405
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-110 (West 2007) (requiring proof that the experiment is in the individual’s
“best interests”).
333
Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 326, at 131-32 (discussing the application of state consent to
treatment and durable power of attorney for health care statutes to consent to research participation).
334
T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
335
Id. at 194.
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to acquire knowledge.336 Research, according to the attorney general, should not be
conflated with healthcare.337
IV.

MORAL IMPERATIVE OR LEGAL AND ETHICS FAILURE?

¶ 86
Keeping these federal and state developments in mind, I now examine the
ethical and legal implications of neuroimaging research into DOC. To start, I identify the
anticipated benefits of these studies, if any, and the importance of the knowledge that
may reasonably be expected to result. Then, I balance these benefits against the relevant
risks.

A. Neuroimaging Benefits
A benefit may be defined as “a valued or desired outcome; an advantage.”338
Research benefits may be divided into direct benefits, indirect benefits, and aspirational
benefits.339 Direct benefits, which are those benefits that arise from the subject’s receipt
of the intervention under study, include positive physiological responses, diagnostic
benefits, and preventive benefits.340 The analysis of direct benefits in the context of
neuroimaging research into DOC is tricky because neuroimaging research is not expected
to produce an immediate positive physiological response. For example, the authors of
fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3 were not studying the ability of a neural implant to reduce the
length of a subject’s impaired consciousness or to assist a subject in progressing from one
DOC, such as VS, to MCS or consciousness.341 So we might state that the research
¶ 87

336

OFFICE OF THE MARYLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL, POLICY STUDY ON ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE CARE
Chapter 2 at 22 (2004), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Healthpol/Alzheimers.htm (last visited
August 1, 2007).
337
Id.
338
OFFICE FOR PROTECTION FROM RESEARCH RISKS, OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
GUIDEBOOK 3-1, NIH Pub. 93-3470 (1993).
339
Walter Glannon, Phase I Oncology Trials: Why the Therapeutic Misconception Will Not Go Away, 32 J.
MED. ETHICS 252, 252 (2006). See also OFFICE FOR PROTECTION FROM RESEARCH RISKS, OFFICE OF
EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS:
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK 3-8, NIH Pub. No. 93-3470 (1993) [hereinafter, IRB
GUIDEBOOK] (“The benefits of research fall into two major categories: benefits to subjects and benefits to
society.”).
340
See King, supra note 18, at 333; University of Miami, Human Subjects Research Office, Special
Considerations for International Research (June 5, 2007), available at
https://eprost.med.miami.edu/eprost/Rooms/DisplayPages/LayoutInitial?Container=com.webridge.entity.E
ntity%5BOID%5B6901EE84C6E8274EA34B8AEA8FE55518%5D%5D (last visited Aug. 5, 2007)
(defining non-therapeutic research as research conducted without the intent to produce a diagnostic,
preventive, or therapeutic benefit to the current subjects).
341
See supra Parts I(B), (C), and (D). Although the authors of fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3 were not studying
the efficacy of neural implants or other interventions for the treatment of disorders of consciousness, other
clinicians and scientists have. Famous Floridian Terri Schiavo, for example, was transported to California
for the implantation of a neural stimulator, although it ultimately had no effect on her VS. Other patients
who have received implants reportedly have demonstrated a positive physiological response. See Tom
Avril, Brain Implant Revives Injured Man, PHILLY.COM, Aug. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/20070801_Brain_implant_revives_injured_man.html (last
visited Aug. 4, 2007).
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subjects in fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3 (as well as participants in other similar neuroimaging
studies) were not receiving an immediate, positive physiological benefit as a result of
research participation (although I will discuss possible secondary rehabilitation-planning
benefits in a moment).
¶ 88
Neuroimaging research into DOC has, however, resulted in several diagnostic
benefits. Recall fMRI Study 3, in which the study authors used fMRI to scan and
compare the brain activations of seven patients in VS and four patients in MCS.342
Among other things, the study authors found that two of the patients in VS and all four of
the patients in MCS showed activation not only in the primary auditory cortex but also in
hierarchically higher-order associative temporal areas.343 The scientists also conducted
additional behavioral testing at one, two, and three months poststudy to examine the
prognostic value of the study344 and found that the two patients in VS who showed the
most widespread activation actually had improved to MCS.345 Thus, we might say that
the research subjects in fMRI Study 3 (especially the two patients in VS who showed the
most widespread activation and eventually emerged to MCS) received a more accurate
differential diagnosis and prognostic assessment.346 fMRI Study 3 is not the only
neuroimaging study that has yielded these diagnostic and prognostic benefits.347 A
review article speaks more generally about the potential diagnostic and prognostic
benefits of other fMRI studies, as well as benefits relating to rehabilitation planning:

The results of these studies, although preliminary, suggest a number of
potential clinical applications. Although bedside clinical examination
remains the criterion standard for establishing diagnosis, fMRI activation
profiles may serve an adjunctive diagnostic role when behavioral findings
are limited or ambiguous. Patients who demonstrate activation of
language network loci in response to linguistic stimulation may be more
likely to retain receptive and expressive language functions than those
who fail to selectively activate these structures. In such cases, clinicians
should be particularly cautious before rendering a diagnosis of vegetative
state. fMRI activation profiles may also inform prognosis in patients who
show no behavioral evidence of language or visual processing. In such
patients, robust activation of cortical networks that mediate language or
visuoperception may presage subsequent recovery of these functions.
Interestingly, [certain] patients [have] regained expressive speech as well
342

Di et al., supra note 10, at 896.
Id. at 897 and 898.
344
Id. at 896.
345
Id. at 897.
346
See, e.g., Giacino et al., supra note 7, at S67 (“Novel applications of functional neuroimaging in patients
with disorders of consciousness may aid in differential diagnosis, prognostic assessment and identification
of pathophysiologic mechanisms.”).
347
To simplify my benefit analysis, I have focused only on fMRI Study 3, but fMRI Studies 1 and 2 also
yielded diagnostic benefits. In fMRI Study 1, the study authors found neural activity in the two patients in
MCS in response to the forward playing of the audio narratives. Schiff et al., supra note 8, at 514. In fMRI
Study 2, the authors found that their subject, a twenty-three-year-old woman in VS, exhibited neural
responses that were indistinguishable from the responses of healthy subjects. Owen et al., supra note 9, at
1402.
343
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as the ability to consistently follow basic commands. [Another] patient,
who initially showed no evidence of object recognition, regained the
ability to identify and use common objects in a functional manner before
hospital discharge. . . .
The fMRI findings may also provide guidance in rehabilitation planning.
In patients with disorders of consciousness, it is often difficult to
determine if the absence of command-following is due to impaired
arousal, aphasia, akinesia, or motor impairment. The approach to
treatment may differ considerably depending on which of these disorders
accounts for the failure to follow commands. If one were to find
significant activation of left temporal structures involved in language
processing, but minimal activation of mesial frontal structures linked to
behavioral initiation, it would be reasonable to assume that akinesia was
the principal factor in the command-following deficit. Consequently,
rehabilitative interventions would likely include aggressive behavioral
prompting strategies and neurostimulants rather than aphasia therapy.348
¶ 89
Some believe that neuroimaging research into DOC yields not only diagnostic,
prognostic, and rehabilitation-planning benefits but also benefits that I will call, for want
of a better term, “preventive benefits.” Specifically, some families and ethicists are
comfortable withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from patients in VS
but not patients in MCS.349 Arguably, one preventive benefit of a study involving a
patient previously diagnosed as VS who, via fMRI, demonstrates minimally conscious–
like processing, would be that the patient’s life support will remain intact and the patient
will not be allowed to die. Others would disagree about the characterization of such a
finding as a benefit, emphasizing that the findings of neuroimaging studies should not
alter end-of-life decision making: “None of this changes the fact however that most
people wouldn’t want to be kept alive artificially in a MCS either and going from a
[persistent] VS to an MCS is no real improvement in the big scheme of things.”350
¶ 90
In summary, neuroimaging studies into DOC, at least currently, do not and are
not expected to yield an immediate positive physiological benefit to research subjects.
However, a review of the relevant literature shows that some neuroimaging research
yields (1) immediate diagnostic and prognostic benefits (especially for patients believed

348

Giacino et al., supra note 7, at S73.
See, e.g., Laureys et al., Brain Function, supra note 11, at 544 (“Foremost is the concern that diagnostic
and prognostic accuracy is certain, as treatment decisions typically include the possibility of life-support.”);
GLANNON, supra note 33, at 170, 171-72 (“Mechanical ventilation and artificial hydration and nutrition can
permissibly be withdrawn from patients who have lost all higher brain function. These would include
patients diagnosed as permanently vegetative. Withdrawing these forms of life support is permissible
because they lack the capacity for interests and therefore cannot be harmed. . . . Would we make the same
claims about patients who fall into and remain in a minimally conscious state? . . . [H]e or she could have
an interest in continuing to live. Although some might consider this to be a weak sense of interest, it could
be enough to prohibit any action that might cause him or her to permanently lose the capacity for
consciousness, however minimal this capacity might be. By defeating such a person’s interest in
continuing to live, such an action could harm that person.”).
350
See, e.g., Rosielle, supra note 129.
349
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to be in VS but in whom fMRI reveals minimally conscious-like processing), (2) the
benefit of assistance with rehabilitation planning, and (3) an arguable preventive benefit,
which would be the nonapplication of measures to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment.
¶ 91
The second type of research benefit includes indirect benefits, also called
collateral benefits.351 Indirect benefits arise from being a subject even if the subject does
not receive the intervention under study.352 Indirect benefits can be physiological, such
as a free physical examination, or psychological, such as the psychological reward of
inclusion.353 The participants in fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3 received some collateral
benefits. All of the participants in fMRI Study 3, for example, received extensive and
repeated clinical examinations, including examinations using five different validated
behavioral scales, to arrive at an initial diagnosis of VS or MCS prior to the participants’
brain scans.354
¶ 92
The third type of research benefit includes aspirational benefits, which include
benefits to society and future patients as a result of the study.355 The production of
generalizable knowledge has been described as the raison d’être of research.356 A
research project must offer a reasonable prospect of producing generalizable knowledge;
otherwise, the risks of the project will not be justified, even if the subjects will directly
benefit.357 Aspirational benefits are, perhaps, the easiest of the three benefits to identify
in neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC. Relevant aspirational benefits
include knowledge regarding the underlying functional neuroanatomy of the different
DOCs, data that might be used by future clinicians to make more accurate differential
diagnoses, data that might be used by future clinicians to herald further recovery, and
data that might be used by future clinicians to plan rehabilitation strategies.358 Some
scientists believe that neuroimaging studies also may, someday, lead to the development
of methods of communication with some individuals with DOC359 and, further down the
road, support interventions such as neuromodulation that may help restore function to
some individuals with DOC.360
351

King, supra note 18, at 333.
Id.
353
Id. at 334.
354
Di et al., supra note 10, at 896.
355
King, supra note 18, at 333-34.
356
Id.
357
Id. See also 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2007) (defining research as “a systematic investigation, including
research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge”).
358
See, e.g., Giacino et al., supra note 7, at S74 (“potential benefits [include] . . . a better understanding of
mechanisms of recovery, improved neuroimaging, electrophysiologic, and behavioral assessment
techniques and the development of effective neurorehabilitative interventions.”) (internal citations omitted).
359
See, e.g., Owen et al., supra note 9, at 1402 (“However, in the case described here, the presence of
reproducible and robust task-dependent responses to command without the need for any practice or training
suggests a method by which some noncommunicative patients, including those diagnosed as vegetative,
minimally conscious, or locked in, may be able to use their residual cognitive capabilities to communicate
their thoughts to those around them by modulating their own neural activity.”).
360
See, e.g., Giacino et al., supra note 7, at S67 (2006) (“Improvements in patient characterization may, in
turn, provide new opportunities for restoration of function through interventional neuromodulation.”).
352
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¶ 93
Before I balance these direct, indirect, and aspirational benefits against the risks
of neuroimaging research, a historical comparison may help place these benefits in their
proper context. Recall Harold Blauer, the tennis professional who was enrolled in the
Army’s chemical warfare research project in late 1952 and early 1953, a few weeks
before he was scheduled to be released from the New York State Psychiatric Institute.361
Blauer received no direct benefits as a result of his research participation. The mescaline
injections Blauer received were completely unrelated to his psychiatric condition362 and
were not intended to serve any diagnostic or therapeutic purpose.363 Blauer also received
few, if any, indirect benefits. Although some subjects experience a psychological benefit
due to their inclusion in a research project, Blauer most likely did not; indeed, he was
“apprehensive” about his participation in the study, which required “considerable
persuasion,” and he verbally expressed both his dislike of the injections and his desire to
withdraw from the study on more than one occasion.364 Perhaps one could attempt to
characterize the free postinjection nursing examinations365 as an indirect benefit;
however, since these examinations served only to document Blauer’s suffering, they
likely would not qualify. The study did, however, involve aspirational benefits.
According to the Army’s research proposal, “new technical data will be derived . . .
which will provide a firmer basis for the utilization of psychochemical agents both for
offensive use as sabotage weapons and for protection against them.”366 These wartime
aspirations were, however, completely unrelated to the subjects’ psychiatric conditions.
Stated another way, the Army was using a population of individuals with mental illness
to conduct an experiment that would in no way contribute to knowledge regarding the
diagnosis or treatment of mental illness.
¶ 94
Like the Army’s chemical warfare research, the Willowbrook study also yielded
no direct benefits (unless one wants to classify intentional infection with hepatitis as a
preventive benefit) and few, if any, indirect benefits, although fair aspirational benefits
(many of which ultimately were achieved) relating to the treatment and prevention of
hepatitis B.367 Again, though, the scientists were using a population of individuals with
developmental disabilities to conduct an experiment that would in no way contribute to
knowledge regarding the diagnosis or habilitation of such developmental disabilities.

The slim benefits of the Army chemical warfare research and the Willowbrook
study certainly do not stand as a minimum threshold above which all other study benefits
will tend to favorably balance against research risks. Other studies yielding direct and
indirect benefits of a greater likelihood and magnitude also may not balance favorably
against research risks. The Army chemical warfare study and the Willowbrook study are,
however, classic examples of the types of experiments the Common Rule and other
ethical and legal guidelines were designed to protect against; that is, experiments
¶ 95

361

See supra Part II(B).
Barrett, 660 F. Supp. at 1298-99.
363
Id. at 1299.
364
Id.
365
Id. at 1321 (providing detailed nursing notes that document Blauer’s post-injection suffering, including
especially detailed nursing notes following the fifth injection from which he died).
366
Id. at 1295 (ellipsis in original).
367
See supra Part II(C).
362
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involving vulnerable populations that are expected to yield no direct benefits, few if any
indirect benefits, and some aspirational benefits that are completely unrelated to the
subjects’ vulnerable conditions. In contrast, fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3, as well as other
neuroimaging studies into DOC, involve fair diagnostic, prognostic, and rehabilitationplanning benefits; an arguable preventive benefit; some indirect benefits; and several
aspirational goals that directly relate to the management and treatment of DOC.
B. Neuroimaging Risks
Although the Common Rule defines only minimal risk, not risk, 368 a research
risk may be defined as the probability of harm or injury (physical, psychological, social,
or economic) that occurs as a result of research participation.369 IRBs must consider not
only the nature of research risks but also their likelihood and magnitude.370 Research
involving MRI, including fMRI, requires its subjects to lie inside a relatively narrow
horizontal cylinder located within a larger machine that houses a permanent magnetic
field of high intensity, usually 1.5 Tesla or more.371 Body images, including
neuroimages, are acquired via technologies that cause “the fast commutation of smaller
additional magnetic fields ([called] gradients) and the sending of quick but intense radiofrequency pulses.”372 For purposes of this article, I will simply assume that
neuroimaging research does raise some social and economic risks, including the possible
loss of confidentiality and privacy.373 The question I will address here is whether MRI
poses physical, or possibly psychological, risks to human subjects with DOC.
¶ 96

¶ 97
The FDA regulates two of the parameters that can be used during MRI: the
deposition of heat and the threshold for commuting the magnetic field.374 To the extent
scientists involved in neuroimaging research use MRI machines that are approved for
clinical use by the FDA and contain software that both compute the correct parameters
and ensure they are not exceeded, any possible risks relating to the rise of the subject’s
tissue temperature or the stimulation of the subject’s peripheral nerves should be

368

45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2007) (failing to define risk; defining minimal risk as when “the probability and
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those
ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological
examinations or tests.”). See generally IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 339, at 3-1 (discussing the meaning of
risk).
369
Id.
370
Id.
371
See, e.g., Unité de Neuroimagerie Cognitive, Practical and Ethical Aspects of Neuroimaging Research
In Infants, available at http://www.unicog.org/main/pages.php?page=InfantEthics (last visited Aug. 5,
2007) (describing an MRI procedure).
372
Id. (describing MRI technology).
373
The social and economic risks posed by fMRI are important and warrant discussion, although they are
beyond the scope of this article. They have been addressed elsewhere. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino,
Functional Neuroimaging: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism? 34 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2007) (examining the confidentiality, privacy, identity, employment, and disability implications of
advances in fMRI); Brain Imaging and the Law Symposium, 33(2-3) AM. J. L. & MED. (forthcoming 2007)
(a collection of articles examining many of the social and economic implications of advances in fMRI
under criminal law, constitutional law, evidence law, and research ethics).
374
Unité de Neuroimagerie Cognitive, supra note 371.
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minimized.375 Most would agree that “there are no known significant risks with [MRI] at
this time since the radiofrequency magnetic fields and magnetic fields, at the strengths
used, are felt to be without harm,” at least in nonpregnant persons.376
¶ 98
As a result, many believe that the only possibly risky aspects of MRI relate to its
magnetic field, which is strong enough to displace ferromagnetic objects, and its noise.377
MRI’s permanent magnetic field can easily move coins, pens, watches, hair clips, belts,
the underwire in some bras, chairs, clipboards, and any other object that contains metal
that might happen to be located in the imaging suite or on or within the subject.378 In the
clinical setting, including hospitals and imaging centers, the FDA has found lapses in
human-controlled screening and safety measures that have resulted in patient injury and
death, including one case in which a patient died when her aneurysm clip moved during a
clinical MRI scan and lacerated her middle cerebral artery.379 This result occurred
notwithstanding the policy of most hospitals and imaging centers to assign to scanning
procedures only certified radiology technicians who have completed one to four years of
relevant coursework, including coursework in MRI safety, and to hold them responsible
for complying with detailed and redundant screening policies and procedures that ensure
that no metal objects are left in the imaging suite or on the patient and that patients in
whom metal is identified are not scanned.380 Some, although not all, suggest that safety
procedures may be less standardized (and the risks of adverse events may be greater) in
the research setting, where individuals who conduct screening examinations (including
375

Id. See also Brown University MRI Research Facility Informed Consent Addendum, available at
http://research.brown.edu/pdf/HRPO.MRI.consent.w-FDA11-22-06.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2007)
[hereinafter, Brown Policy] (“There is a risk of heating from radiofrequency imaging coils, the cables of
radiofrequency imaging coils, and/or the cables from monitoring devices such as those that record
physiologic processes by way of an electrocardiogram, pulse oximeter, and/or plethysmograph. Please
report any heating/burning sensation immediately. You are encouraged to signal to have the scan stopped at
any time if this occurs.”).
376
Brown Policy, supra note 375. See also NATIONAL INST. MENTAL HEALTH, MRI RESEARCH SAFETY
AND ETHICS: POINTS TO CONSIDER (2005), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/council/mri-researchsafety-ethics.pdf (last visited July 7, 2007) [hereinafter, NIMH Report] (“At present, there is no known risk
of MR brain scanning of a pregnant woman to the developing fetus for scanning at 4T or less, and no
known mechanism of potential risk under normal operating procedures. Nonetheless, the possibility that
risks may be discovered in the future cannot be ruled out. Therefore, exposure of fetuses to MR scanning
without any prospect of direct benefit may not be ethically justifiable. Indeed, the general policy in many
clinical Radiology Departments is not to scan anyone who may be pregnant, absent compelling clinical
need. Thus, it is appropriate to screen for pregnancy and to exclude pregnant participants for the sake of
caution.”).
377
Unité de Neuroimagerie Cognitive, supra note 371.
378
Id.
379
See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., FDA SAFETY ALERT: MRI RELATED DEATH OF PATIENT WITH
ANEURYSM CLIP (Nov. 25, 1992), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/safety/112592-mriclip.pdf (last
visited Aug. 6, 2007) (“FDA has learned of a fatal injury sustained by a patient with a cerebral aneurysm
clip while she was being prepared for an MRI procedure. It was reported that upon exposure to the
magnetic field in the room, the clip moved and lacerated the patient’s middle cerebral artery. The
explanted device was subsequently shown to be magnetically active. This particular style or clip, which
was implanted in 1978, was listed in several articles and recent medical texts as non-deflecting in a
magnetic field.”).
380
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, RADIOLOGY TECHNOLOGISTS AND
TECHNICIANS, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos105.htm#training (last visited Aug. 6, 2007)
(discussing the training and qualifications of radiology technicians).
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scientists, their graduate students, and other members of their research team) are less
trained in MRI safety than their clinical counterparts.381
To minimize the risks associated with flying or emerging metal objects,
scientists and other study team members who are involved in the actual scanning portion
of an fMRI study must be specifically trained regarding the ferromagnetic dangers of
MRI and required to perform sufficiently detailed and redundant screening procedures.382
Although metal objects located in the imaging suite or on the subject’s person are not too
difficult to identify, less obvious are metal objects that lie within the subject’s body,
including pacemakers, aneurysm clips, surgical clips, other metal implants and
prostheses, metallic shavings from war shrapnel or employment that involved grinding
metal including metal filings remaining in the eye, dental and orthodontic apparatuses,
and even metallic substances remaining around the eye due to the application of cosmetic
eye shadow.383 Although conscious potential subjects can inform study coordinators
whether they have been exposed to metal in one or more of these ways, subjects with
DOC cannot. The potential subject’s exposure to metal would have to be revealed by a
family member or other person familiar with the subject’s medical and employment
history, a handheld metal detector, another method of body scanning, or preferably, a
combination of all three.384
¶ 99

¶ 100
The other possible MRI risk relates to the noise of the MRI machine. The sound
of the magnet working within the MRI machine can be quite loud.385 Analyzing the
likelihood of the risk of hearing damage or discomfort associated with loud noises to
individuals with DOC is tricky because one pressing scientific question is whether
individuals with DOC demonstrate neural activity (and, if so, what kind and what it
means) when they are exposed to passive auditory tasks.386 Stated (and very much
conflated) in layperson’s terms, can individuals with DOC hear?387 Assuming only for

381

See, e.g., Jennifer Kulynych, The Regulation of MR Neuroimaging Research: Disentangling the Gordian
Knot, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 295, 311-12 (2007) (discussing MRI safety); Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body
Structure and Mapping Brain Function, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 193, 225 and text accompanying nn. 299 and
300 (2007) (quoting Kulynych).
382
Id. In particular, the authors and the members of their study team should be familiar with the MRI
safety information and recommended scanning procedures set forth by the NIMH Report, supra note 376 at
B-1 (“Given that the MRI environment presents many potential dangers to untrained or improperly
screened individuals, the Workgroup recognized the need for appropriate levels of training for all
individuals who operate the scanner and/or have routine access to the MRI suite and for a clearly specified
scheme for training and certifying individuals for each level of authorization. A range of options was
mentioned for certification, including didactic training, mastery of written materials, and terms of
apprenticeship, as well as written and/or practical tests.”).
383
See, e.g., Brown Policy, supra note 375 (identifying all of the metal objects for which Brown University
scientists screen in MRI studies); see also NIMH Report, supra note 376, throughout (mentioning several
different types of metal objects that can pose risk to subjects).
384
See NIMH Report, supra note 376, at A-6 (discussing the supplementary, not replacement, value of a
hand-held metal detector).
385
Id. at D-3.
386
See supra Introduction, at second sentence; Laureys, Neural Correlate, supra note 1, at 557 (asking,
“Do patients in a vegetative state feel or hear anything?”); Hirsch et al., fMRI Reveals Intact Cognitive
Systems, supra note 3.
387
Id.

Vol. 13

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

No. 2

2008

Tovino, Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of Consciousness

50

the sake of argument that individuals with DOC can process auditory stimuli, the
magnitude of any hearing damage or noise discomfort and the ability of scientists to
minimize these risks must be assessed.
¶ 101
Studies involving infants show that an MRI’s magnet noise can be minimized to
12 decibels (dB) higher than quiet conversation, which is 18 dB lower than a lawn mower
and 38 dB lower than a car horn.388 In neuroimaging studies involving infants, scientists
minimize magnet noise by covering the magnet tunnel with a special noise-protection
foam and placing over each infant’s head a noise-protection helmet that includes
headphones that are, in turn, covered by an additional foam mold.389 The combination of
the foam applications and the headphones reduces noise and vibrations inside the
tunnel.390 Even after implementing these noise protections, the scientists still may deliver
any auditory stimuli required by the research protocol to the subject through piezoelectric
loudspeakers located in the headphones.391 In neuroimaging studies involving infants,
“[t]he level of sound presentation is adjusted to a comfortable level, easily
understandable above the residual scanning noise by a normal adult. . . . The success of
[these] noise protection measures is indicated by the fact that many babies fall asleep
during the imaging procedure, or stay asleep throughout.”392
¶ 102
Before I balance these possible risks and discomforts against the benefits of
neuroimaging research and the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result, a
historical comparison may help place these risks in their proper context. In the case of
Harold Blauer and the Army’s chemical warfare research,393 the scientists were aware, as
a result of prior toxicity testing involving mice, that death (at least to mice) was a fair
possibility.394 They also knew (or at least one court found that they knew) that the
scientists had not yet conducted additional toxicity testing sufficient to determine the
chemical’s safety in humans.395 Likewise, the authors of the Willowbrook study knew
that the Willowbrook students would be intentionally infected with the hepatitis B virus
and that such infection can cause lifelong infection, cirrhosis (scarring) of the liver, liver
cancer, liver failure, and death.396 The significant risks of the Army chemical warfare
research and the Willowbrook study certainly do not stand as a threshold below which all
other study risks will tend to favorably balance against research benefits. Other studies
yielding risks of a lower likelihood and magnitude also may not balance favorably
against research benefits. The Army chemical warfare study and the Willowbrook study
are, however, classic examples of the types of experiments the Common Rule and other
ethical and legal guidelines were designed to protect against—that is, experiments that
involve risks of great magnitude, including death and lifelong infection, which could not
(then) be prevented. In contrast, most would agree that current neuroimaging studies into

388

Unité de Neuroimagerie Cognitive, supra note 371.
Id.
390
Id.
391
Id.
392
Id.
393
See supra Part II(B).
394
Barrett, 660 F. Supp. at 1315.
395
Id.
396
See, e.g., Goldby, supra note 250, at 280.
389
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DOC involve two possible risks—ferromagnetic injuries and deaths and noise injury or
discomfort—although each risk carries a very low probability that can be minimized, if
not eliminated, with human-controlled safety precautions.
C. Balancing Risks and Benefits
Neuroimaging research into DOC thus raises a decades-old question: How do
we balance the rights and interests of research subjects with scientific progress and
benefits to future patients?397 Current federal law establishes a reasonableness test: Are
the risks of neuroimaging reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits, if any, to
subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to
result?398 This assessment is considered the major ethical and legal judgment made in the
context of human-subjects research.399 The analysis is difficult in part because federal
and state law provide so little guidance regarding the required balancing and because the
studies under question involve functional neuroimaging, which many still consider an
emerging discipline.400
¶ 103

¶ 104
The former Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) (now, the Office
for Human Research Protections) has provided some questions to help guide risk-benefit
assessments, including whether the research involves “the use of interventions that have
the intent and reasonable probability of providing benefit for the individual subjects or
only involves procedures performed for research purposes.”401 “In research involving an
intervention expected to provide direct benefit to the subjects, a certain amount of risk is
justifiable.”402 On the other hand, “in any trial of a new or not yet validated treatment,
the ratio of benefits to risks should be similar to those presented by any available
alternative therapy.”403 As discussed in detail in Part III(A), neuroimaging research into
DOC may offer its subjects some diagnostic, prognostic, and rehabilitation-planning
benefits, as well as a debated preventive benefit and several aspirational benefits relating
to the management and possible treatment of future patients with DOC. Neuroimaging
research does not, however, provide an immediate, positive physiological benefit to
subjects. Neuroimaging research is, thus, “in between” with respect to benefits. Again, it
is not directly and immediately therapeutic; however, it can yield diagnostic and
prognostic benefits that may, in turn, yield secondary rehabilitation and clinical
management benefits. It also may, according to several scientists, help support future
patients with DOC with respect to methods of communication and, eventually, therapy.
Importantly, scientists cannot study DOC or contribute to their understanding by studying
healthy subjects. Only by enrolling individuals with DOC can the relevant direct and
aspirational benefits be achieved. Stated another way, only through better understanding
of DOC can care for individuals with DOC be improved.

397

MORENO, supra note 160, at 126.
45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2007).
399
IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 339, at 3-8.
400
See Champlain & Patenaude, supra note 325, at 533.
401
IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 339, at 3-8–3-9.
402
Id. at 3-9.
403
Id.
398
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¶ 105
According to the former OPRR, in research where no direct benefits to the
subject are anticipated, the IRB must evaluate whether the risks presented by procedures
performed solely to obtain generalizable knowledge are ethically acceptable.404 There
should be a limit to the risks that society (through the government and research
institutions) asks individuals to accept for the benefit of others, but IRBs should not be
overly protective.405 As discussed above, neuroimaging conducted without proper
screening procedures may pose a ferromagnetic risk of injury or death and may cause
noise discomfort. However, with sufficiently detailed and redundant screening
procedures as well as foam installation and headphones, these risks can be minimized if
not completely eliminated. The question here is whether these risks, as minimized, are
reasonable in relation to the benefits of neuroimaging research. I think they are.

My opinion is based, in part, on my balancing of human-subjects protections and
access to therapies. Taking a purely protectionist stance, we could refuse to allow
individuals with DOC to participate in neuroimaging research even though the remote
risks of the research could be minimized if not eliminated by human controls.406 The
theory behind this position is that it is preferable to protect potential subjects from harm,
including potential, unlikely harm, even if the result is less progress with respect to
generalizable knowledge and less progress with respect to the creation of and access to
new therapies designed to manage, improve, or treat the very conditions from which the
potential subjects suffer.407 Taking a pure “access” stance, on the other hand, we could
view any barriers to enrolling individuals with DOC in neuroimaging research as suspect
because these barriers would prevent the subjects from realizing any diagnostic,
prognostic, and rehabilitation-planning benefits, as well as prevent future patients from
realizing the benefits of new therapies.408 From this position, it may be considered
unethical to exclude an individual with a tentative DOC diagnosis whose research
participation may lead to a more accurate diagnosis or prognosis. Neither of these
approaches is optimal. Under the first approach, we are protecting human subjects but
not furthering understanding and possible treatment of the very conditions from which
they suffer. Under the second approach, we are contributing to knowledge and
potentially supporting the development of new methods of communication and new
therapies although the subjects may not be receiving some or all of the protections they
deserve.
¶ 106

¶ 107
I worry that the tragic history of human-subjects research involving individuals
with psychiatric conditions and developmental disabilities409 is causing IRBs, scientific
journals, and funding agencies to underappreciate the potential benefits of minimally
risky fMRI research and to overstate its risks, with the end result being the wholesale
adoption of a protectionist model with regard to neuroimaging research into DOC.410 I
think that a careful, detailed, and thoughtful review of the history of exploitation of
404

Id.
Id.
406
COLEMAN, supra note 160, at 589.
407
Id.
408
Id.
409
See supra Part II(A)-(C).
410
Fins, supra note 162, at 326.
405
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vulnerable human research subjects (and the relevant ethical and legal principles) is
necessary each and every time we commence research in an emerging discipline,
including functional neuroimaging. This rich history can guide us in our assessment of
risks, benefits, and their proper balance, as well as the identification of relevant ethical
and legal principles. I do not think, however, that neuroimaging research into DOC
conducted with proper screening procedures and adherence to other protections warrants
a purely protectionist stance. Accordingly, I recommend that IRBs, scientific journals,
and funding agencies no longer stall the conduct, publication, and funding of
neuroimaging research into DOC if, and only if, all the following criteria are satisfied.
D. Criteria and Recommendations
To minimize risks and ensure that they are reasonable in relation to anticipated
benefits, scientists conducting neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC
should adhere to the following eleven criteria.411 First, scientists must not be able to
conduct their proposed research projects with less vulnerable populations. In the case of
neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC, this means that the aim of the
research cannot effectively be accomplished with healthy subjects or subjects with less
severely impaired consciousness.
¶ 108

¶ 109
Second, the neuroimaging research must have the aim of contributing to the
scientific understanding of DOC. Individuals with DOC should not be included in
research unrelated to their conditions.
¶ 110
Third, participation in neuroimaging research must not adversely affect the
individual’s underlying DOC. If a potential research subject requires medical or other
support that must be discontinued during the scan, the individual shall be excluded from
research participation.

Fourth, scientists conducting neuroimaging studies into DOC must familiarize
themselves with all aspects of MRI safety, including the proceedings and safety
recommendations of the National Institutes of Mental Health Council Workgroup on
MRI Research Practices, established in 2005.412 Any study team member who is
involved in the actual scanning process must be thoroughly educated regarding the
ferromagnetic and noise risks associated with MRI and shall perform or support
sufficiently detailed and redundant screening of the imaging suite and the body of the
potential subject. I highly recommend that the study team contract with an independent
certified radiology technician or another individual who has comparable education in
MRI safety. Although this recommendation will cause the research team to incur
additional costs, these costs are worth the assurance that the imaging suite and all
subjects have been properly screened and that the screening process is not rushed.
¶ 111

411

These criteria are designed to comply with the Common Rule provision requiring adoption of additional
safeguards to protect the rights and welfare of subjects and potential subjects with mental disabilities. 45
C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (2007).
412
NIMH REPORT, supra note 376.
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¶ 112
Fifth, if there are any doubts regarding a potential subject’s exposure to metal
due to the mixed or ambivalent results of another method of body scanning, such as a
handheld metal scanner, or the family’s unfamiliarity with the individual’s medical or
employment history, the individual shall be excluded from research participation.413
¶ 113
Sixth, scientists conducting neuroimaging research shall identify and implement
the best noise-reduction strategies currently available, which may include foam helmets,
foam headphones, and foam wrapping of the MRI tunnel.414 Scientists shall consult the
noise-reduction measures adopted in other neuroimaging studies involving vulnerable
populations, including infants. Research designs shall incorporate neuroimaging
techniques that are “maximally comfortable, fast, and efficient” and should include
consideration of rapid-acquisition protocols.415

Seventh, any LAR416 who is approached regarding the research participation of
an individual with DOC must be informed through both conversation and documentation
(1) that the neuroimaging study constitutes research, not treatment and that the scientists
expect the research to yield no direct, immediate physiological benefits to the
individual;417 (2) of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject,418
including applicable ferromagnetic risks and any possible noise injuries or discomfort;
and (3) of any benefits to the subjects or to others that may reasonably be expected to
result419 including, as applicable, more accurate diagnoses and prognoses, as well as any
secondary rehabilitation planning or clinical management benefits.
¶ 114

¶ 115
Eighth, the scientists must allow the LAR to withdraw her consent to the
individual’s research participation at any time for any reason, including during a scanning
procedure already begun.420 The scientists or other study team members involved in the
scanning process shall monitor any verbal or nonverbal signs or signals from the
individual that may be interpreted as symptoms of distress resulting from the scanning
procedure. I anticipate assessment of these signs and signals to be difficult, especially
with individuals in higher levels of MCS who may display both reflexive movements and
inconsistent responses to environmental stimuli. If any member of the study or scanning
team believes that a particular sign, signal, movement, or response suggests distress, the
413

See, e.g., Unité de Neuroimagerie Cognitive, supra note 371 (“If we have any doubt about the presence
of metallic material (e.g. surgical material), we do not proceed with the examination. Because we are
dealing with normal volunteers, there is simply no reason to take any risk.”).
414
Id. (noting that a “noise protection helmet, providing noise attenuation between 30 and 35 dB for
frequencies between 250 and 8000 Hz, is placed on the infants' ears, then covered by a foam mold that
provides supplementary noise protection and ensures that the helmet stays in place during the study”);
NIMH REPORT, supra note 376.
415
See, e.g., Judy Illes et al., Prospects for Prediction: Ethics Analysis of Neuroimaging in Alzheimer’s
Disease, 1097 ANNALS. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 278, 285 (2007) (making this suggestion in the context of
neuroimaging research involving individuals with Alzheimer’s disease).
416
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(4) (2007) (“Informed consent will be sought from each prospective subject or
the subject’s legally authorized representative . . . .”).
417
See id. § 46.116(a)(1).
418
See id. § 46.116(a)(2).
419
See id. § 46.116(a)(3).
420
See id. § 46.116(a)(8) (“[Research] participation is voluntary . . . and the subject may discontinue
participation at any time . . . .”).
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scanning procedure shall be immediately discontinued. This criterion is meant to
incorporate the research ethics concept of “continuous consent,” also called “behavioral
consent.”421
¶ 116
Ninth, both scientists and clinicians must be especially careful to assure LARs
that the care of an individual with DOC will not be affected if the LAR chooses not to
enroll the individual in research. Like patients, LARs “may be susceptible to real or
imaginary pressure” to consent to research.422 If a scientist also happens to be the
individual’s physician, the LAR may feel obligated to consent to the individual’s research
participation “out of a desire to please, gratitude, or fear that failure to do so will result in
hostility or abandonment.”423 LARs who act on behalf of individuals who reside in
facilities such as rehabilitation hospitals or long-term-care hospitals may be particularly
worried that the individual will receive poor treatment if the LAR refuses to consent.424
Patients who are not enrolled in research must continue to receive the same attention,
care, and compassion as patients who are enrolled. This criterion is designed to prevent
the exploitation of captive populations such as the patients at the New York State
Psychiatric Institute and the student body at Willowbrook.

Tenth, scientists conducting neuroimaging research into DOC shall adhere to the
other requirements set forth in the Common Rule including, but not limited to, provisions
relating to IRB approval of research,425 the informed consent process,426 and
documentation of informed consent,427 as well as relevant state law.
¶ 117

¶ 118
Finally, the risk-benefit assessment set forth in this article shall be reviewed
periodically as neuroimaging research progresses. Current prospects for neuroimaging
(including the potential diagnostic, prognostic, clinical management, and rehabilitationplanning benefits) are optimistic. Should, however, additional neuroimaging research fail
to yield these benefits, or should the potential support provided by neuroimaging to future
methods of communication or therapies evaporate, the anticipated benefits of
neuroimaging research may no longer outweigh the risks. In this case, neuroimaging
research into DOC shall be discontinued until such time as new potential benefits,
identified through new research hypotheses, again outweigh neuroimaging risks.
¶ 119
In addition to these eleven criteria, I have one broad recommendation regarding
consent to research participation by surrogates,428 or proxies,429 which I will simply refer

421

See, e.g., P. Allmark & S. Mason, Improving the Quality of Consent to Randomised Controlled Trials by
Using Continuous Consent and Clinician Training in the Consent Process, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 439 (2006).
422
IRB Guidebook, supra note 339, at 3-24.
423
Id.
424
Id.
425
45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2007).
426
Id. § 46.116.
427
Id. § 46.117.
428
A surrogate is a person or persons who are legally authorized to make decisions regarding care or
research participation in the name of a patient or potential subject. E.g., DOREEN M. TOWSLEY-COOK &
TERESE A. YOUNG, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES FOR IMAGING PROFESSIONALS 58 (1999) (“A surrogate
may be a parent, an individual named by the patient while competent, or a person or persons appointed by
the courts.”).
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to as LARs because that is the language of the Common Rule.430 In the seventh and
eighth criteria, I referred to the subject’s LAR; however, I intentionally left my
discussion of LARs until last to prevent conflation of an LAR’s consent to an individual’s
research participation with a favorable risk-benefit assessment. The minimization of
risks and a favorable risk-benefit assessment must occur prior to offering research
participation—either to the potential subject or to her LAR.431 Stated another way,
research in which risks are not minimized or that does not yield a favorable risk-benefit
assessment may not be offered to a potential subject or her LAR. I hope the organization
of this article makes clear the primacy of the minimization of risks and a favorable riskbenefit assessment.
¶ 120
To guide the offering of research participation once the research design
minimizes risk and a favorable risk-benefit assessment has been made, I recommend a
federal regulation (or, barring a federal regulation, uniform state laws) that address LAR
consent to human-subjects research involving individuals with decisional impairments if
the research relates to the individual’s impairment or the same class of impairments. I
impose the “relates to” requirement in an attempt to prevent exploitation of individuals
with decisional impairments in research that is not designed to benefit them or future
patients with the same type of condition.

The core of the Common Rule currently allows LARs to consent,432 but the
definition of LAR refers to “applicable law”433 (i.e., state law in this case), which
varies.434 Some states allow “any person legally empowered to act” to consent to
research participation on behalf of an individual with a decisional impairment,435 while
some states designate only certain individuals, such as court-appointed guardians or
conservators to consent.436 Other states fail to address consent to research participation at
all. State-law variation is especially troublesome in the context of biomedical and
behavioral research, which may be conducted at a laboratory located in one state (e.g.,
New York) but may draw subjects from surrounding states (e.g., the Tri-State Area).437
¶ 121

429

See, e.g., Marian W. Fischman, Informed Consent, in ETHICS IN RESEARCH WITH HUMAN PARTICIPANTS
44 (Bruce D. Sales & Susan Folkman eds., 2000) (“Therefore, for those potential participants who lack the
legal capacity to consent, a proxy consent can be obtained from a parent, guardian, or legally authorized
representative.”); Benjamin Freedman, A Moral Theory of Consent, in INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION:
BASIC ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 266, 273 (Ronald Munson ed., 1979) (“Proxy consent is consent given
on behalf of an individual who is himself incapable of granting consent.”).
430
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c) (2007) (defining LAR as an “individual or judicial or other body authorized under
applicable law to consent on behalf of a prospective subject to the subject’s” research participation); id. §
46.111(a)(4) (“Informed consent will be sought from each prospective subject or the subject’s legally
authorized representative. . . . ”).
431
Id. § 46.111(a) (requiring research projects to satisfy each of seven core criteria, including risks to
subjects being reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits).
432
Id. § 46.111(a)(4).
433
Moreno, supra note 18 at 14.
434
See supra Part II(E) (discussing the variation of state law in this area).
435
See, e.g., N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 2007) (“If the human subject be otherwise
legally unable to render consent, such consent shall be subscribed to in writing by such other person as may
be legally empowered to act on behalf of the human subject.”).
436
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24175(b)(1) (2007).
437
See Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1011.
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IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies, the latter two of which may be located in
still other states, are not trained in conflict-of-law principles and currently make ad hoc
decisions regarding whether LAR consent is ethical or legal regardless of whether
applicable state law permits such consent.438 I therefore recommend one federal law439
(preferably) or uniform state laws identifying both the persons empowered to consent to
research participation on behalf of an individual with a decisional impairment and the
process for such consent.
¶ 122
The ethical and legal issues raised by research involving individuals with
decisional impairments are not going away. Mental disorders, including psychiatric
conditions, developmental disabilities, and DOCs, are particularly recalcitrant, and
scientists face tremendous public and peer pressure to discover new therapies.440
Compliance with the criteria and recommendations set forth above should ensure the
minimization of risks, a favorable balance of risks and benefits, and uniformity in
decision making with regard to surrogate consent in the context of neuroimaging research
involving DOCs.

438

Id. at 1010.
The federal law may be established as a new subpart within the Common Rule at 45 C.F.R. Part 46,
Subpart E.
440
See MORENO, supra note 160, at 157.
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